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ABSTRACT
Though legislatures and agencies are considering how to prevent further
climate change, some adverse effects from a warming climate are already
inevitable. Adapting to these effects is essential, but regulators and scholars
have largely neglected this need. This Article evaluates the capacity of natural
resource governance to cope with the effects of climate change and provides a
framework for Congress to help it do so.
This Article identifies unprecedented uncertainty as the paramount
impediment raised by climate change and demonstrates how existing
fragmented governance is poorly equipped to deal with this challenge.
Drawing on lessons from prior regulatory experiments, it proposes a
comprehensive strategy for managing uncertainty that promotes interagency
information sharing. It also recommends that legislators adopt an “adaptive
governance” framework that requires agencies to systematically monitor and
adapt their decisions and programs. This learning infrastructure would
promote agency learning and accountability, help manage uncertainty, and
reduce the likelihood and magnitude of mistakes expected to come with facing
such an exceptional problem with initially imprecise tools.
This Article operates on four levels. First, it uses case studies to illustrate
valuable lessons about the challenges of creating effective natural resource
management. Second, the Article is anchored in the specific implications of
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climate change, considering the value of interagency information sharing and
adaptive governance in addressing climate effects. Third, it engages the
growing theoretical literature on adaptive management and federalism.
Finally, it provides insight on how agencies can manage uncertainty that has
far-reaching implications for other areas of administrative regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
When a notoriously reticent but highly adaptive1 organism like the polar
bear (Ursus maritimus) is faced with a rapidly changing habitat due to global
warming, it tries to do anything and everything to advance its survival. Well
before modern industrial society released copious amounts of greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere affecting the Arctic marine ecosystem, polar bears have
been subject to a host of evolutionary pressures. However, like so many
ecosystems throughout the globe,2 the polar bear‘s ecosystem is facing a new
flood of stressors that threaten its historic way-of-life—indeed, its existence.
Other problems certainly exist,3 but the most alarming obstacles to polar bear
survival are strongly linked to the rapid decrease in sea ice caused by
greenhouse gas-induced global warming. Polar bears depend on sea ice for
feeding, travel, and shelter,4 but ice is thinning rapidly, making food and
denning less accessible and shortening the bears‘ hunting season.5
Unfortunately, even the polar bear‘s ability to adapt to these recent and
rapid changes is limited. Reduced and thinning sea ice has led to increased
drowning, starvation, weight loss, and cub mortality,6 and some male polar

1

A few of the many polar bear adaptations include translucent fur for camouflage, an acute sense of
smell for identifying distant food sources, a four-inch insulating fat layer, a streamlined body form for
swimming, bow-legged front legs and furred paw pads for gripping sea ice, and flexible gestation periods to
account for food variability. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., The Polar Bear: Ursus maritimus (2006),
http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2006/polarbear.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2009) (detailing traits of polar
bears).
2 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT
31 (2007) (―Observational evidence from all continents and most oceans shows that many natural systems are
being affected by regional climate changes . . . .‖).
3 See, e.g., ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, ARCTIC POLLUTION 2002: PERSISTENT
ORGANIC POLLUTANTS; HEAVY METALS; RADIOACTIVITY; HUMAN HEALTH; CHANGING PATHWAYS 22 (2002)
(detailing polychlorinated biphenyl contamination of polar bears).
4 Andrew E. Derocher et al., Polar Bears in a Warming Climate, 44 INTEGRATIVE & COMP. BIOLOGY
163, 163 (2004).
5 SCOTT SCHLIEBE ET AL., RANGE-WIDE STATUS REVIEW OF THE POLAR BEAR (URSUS MARITIMUS) 77–87
(2006).
6 See ERIC V. REGEHR ET AL., POLAR BEAR POPULATION STATUS IN THE SOUTHERN BEAUFORT SEA
(2006), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2006/1337/ (concluding that loss of sea ice off Alaska has
increased the death rate for polar bear cubs); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination
of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,258,
28,270 (May 15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 17) (discussing the impact of sea ice thinning on polar
bears).
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bears are turning to cannibalism of females and cubs for sustenance.7 As a
result of these pressures, the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) designated
polar bears as threatened8 under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).9 Similar
detrimental effects are expected for a number of species throughout the Arctic
marine food web.10
Only through substantial and enduring human
intervention—aggressive curbing of greenhouse gas emissions and measures
that help species adapt—can the polar bear, and the ecosystem that it inhabits,
continue to survive.
The perhaps well-intentioned but highly un-adaptive regulators that
characteristically manage natural resources11 in the United States are in a
similarly precarious position. Like so many natural ecosystems, the network in
which natural resource managers and regulators are a central constituent—
environmental and natural resources law—is facing a wide array of stressors
that threaten its continued (albeit far from flawless) operation. As it has since
its inception, modern natural resource law is strained by myriad economic
forces, situated in a polarized12 political setting and unsettled by varying
degrees of information uncertainty. This problem is exacerbated by a
confounding array of regulatory fragmentation, with authority over each
resource divided among many local, state, national, and international
authorities.13
As a result of these many competing pressures, over the past several
decades scholars have suggested14—and the U.S. Congress, the President, and
7 Steven C. Amstrup et al., Recent Observations of Intraspecific Predation and Cannibalism Among
Polar Bears in the Southern Beaufort Sea, 29 POLAR BIOLOGY 997, 1001 (2006).
8 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, supra note 6, at 28,212. The World Conservation
Union also designated polar bears as vulnerable. S. Schliebe et al., The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species:
Ursus maritimus (2008), http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/22823.
9 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2008).
10 SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 58–60
(2004).
11 ―Natural resource‖ and ―environmental resource‖ as used in this Article focus on biological resources
and renewable resources on which biota depend (e.g., water and land), not extractive resources such as
minerals and fossil fuels.
12 For example, the listing of the polar bear as threatened, initiated in response to a lawsuit, has now been
challenged in court. See Alaska v. Kempthorne, No. 1:08-cv-01352-EGS (D.D.C. filed Aug. 4, 2008).
13 See infra Part III.A.
14 See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007) [hereinafter Camacho I] (assessing adaptive and collaborative
governance reforms); Michael C. Dorf & Charles E. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283–84 (1998) (arguing for a ―democratic experimentalism‖ model in which agencies
determine and choose how to achieve their own goals); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 97–98 (1997) (discussing collaboration in agency decision making);
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administrative agencies have sporadically instituted15—a succession of
regulatory reforms that have sought to adapt natural resource regulation.
Because of the cacophony of pressures brought to bear on regulators, these
changes have pulled natural resource governance in different directions. Some
modifications may have been primarily motivated by an interest in reducing
regulatory limitations on resource exploitation,16 though many have been
lauded as fostering a more effective approach to conservation.17
Yet because of a consistently weak commitment to regulator accountability
and to improving resource management, these innovations have never been
accompanied by any systematic attempt to determine whether agencies are
working toward achieving conservation and other statutory goals.18 Rather,
numerous studies confirm that the most intense pressures on agencies have
been political rather than scientific.19 Existing evidence also reveals a
concerted resistance to public accountability by both regulators and industry.20
Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 112–13 (1982) (advocating
negotiated rulemaking); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in
Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1439–42 (2008) [hereinafter Karkkainen I] (discussing
ecosystem and place-based natural resource management); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing
the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1995) (detailing market-based, cost-benefit analysis and
information disclosure reforms); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1212 (1994) (contrasting collaborative governance and marketbased innovations).
15 See, e.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Procedure, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2008) (requiring negotiation prior
to official agency actions); 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000) (amending the ESA to allow habitat conservation
plans); Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995) (discussing flexibility
in natural resource regulation); Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 515 app. C, 114 Stat. 2763A-153 (2000) (referred to
variously as the ―Data Quality Act‖ and the ―Information Quality Act‖ and enacted as a two-paragraph
provision in the December 21, 2001, consolidated appropriations bill, the measure requires that information
disseminated by federal agencies meet ―quality‖ standards); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(Oct. 4, 1993) (requiring regulatory impact analyses).
16 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource
Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 569 (2007) (stating adaptive management ―has been used to emphasize
the need to act while downplaying the role of learning‖).
17 See infra Part III.A.2, III.B.2.
18 See infra Part III.B.3.
19 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP‘T OF THE INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS
AGAINST JULIE MACDONALD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS (2007), available
at http://www.doioig.gov/upload/Macdonald.pdf (finding that a DOI official edited scientific reports to
discourage classification of endangered species); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional
Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1468 (2003) (finding political influence had a
more significant effect on ESA listing and funding decisions than biological factors); Holly Doremus, The
Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act‟s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L.
397, 402 n.21 (2004) (enumerating sources discussing how political pressures bear on listing decisions);
Andrew Metrick & Martin L. Weitzman, Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation, 72 LAND
ECON. 1, 12 (1996) (concluding that more charismatic species receive more ESA funding); see also Terry M.
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Nonetheless, with varying degrees of success, natural resources and
resource managers in the United States have subsisted in this disjointed
environment. As for the polar bear, another wave of climatic stressors is
pushing natural resource governance into unchartered territory. The best
available evidence reveals that changes to almost all natural systems will be
greater in orders of magnitude than those caused by any prior stressor that
modern natural resource law has encountered.21 Yet for natural resource
governance, the exceptional uncertainty that arrives with global climate change
is the largest challenge ever faced. In such an uncertain environment, and
given the considerable expense likely to accompany any government effort to
adapt to climate change, the possibility of both catastrophic damage and
excessive and unproductive government regulation is very real.
Climate change necessitates a fundamental reformation of natural resource
governance. The central challenge in fostering successful regulatory evolution
is to cultivate the adaptive pressure on regulatory actors toward better program
―fitness‖—that is, achieving substantive conservation or other express22
statutory goals rather than simply dampening or displacing political
controversy. Drawing on insights from the academic literature on federalism
and adaptive management, as well as lessons from existing experiments, this
Article argues for the promotion of agency learning through adaptive
governance—the systematic assessment and adaptation of management
decisions and regulatory programs. In addition, legislators must establish and
promote use of a shared information infrastructure that provides regulators
opportunities to learn from the knowledge and experience of other regulators
and respond to rapid changes in natural systems, scientific knowledge, and
technology.
By creating this learning infrastructure, legislators can

Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATION THEORY:
FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 116, 125–27 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990)
(describing a study of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and finding that fluctuations in
elected officials‘ preferences resulted in changes in agency policy making); Susan K. Snyder & Barry R.
Weingast, The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress and the NLRB, 16 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 269, 269–70 (2000) (summarizing empirical literature on the political influence on regulation); Barry R.
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by
the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 792–93 (1983) (describing political influence on the
implementation of policies by the FTC).
20 See Camacho I, supra note 14, at 296.
21 See infra Part I.
22 Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL‘Y 61, 62–64 (1994) (providing a textualist critique of attempts to determine statutory intent or goals
when not expressed by statutory text).
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significantly expand the adaptive capacity of regulatory programs to adjust to
and manage unexpected and uncertain problems like climate change.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly details the challenges
raised by climate change both to natural resources and resource governance in
the United States. Though existing data confirm that climate change is having
and will continue to have substantial effects on a wide range of ecosystems,
our knowledge of the extent and distribution of these effects is plagued with
uncertainty for which there is no prior analog. This poses new problems for
natural resource governance. Part II argues for the need to address these
effects through comprehensive ―adaptation‖ as a complement to climate
change ―mitigation.‖23 It also offers a typology of adaptation strategies for
addressing the effects of climate change. In particular, Part II explains the
importance of managing uncertainty through ―procedural‖ strategies that focus
not on addressing the direct effects of climate change, but on adjusting how
management decisions (and therefore adaptation decisions) are made.
Part III focuses on how two pervasive features of natural resource
governance—regulatory fragmentation and inflexible decision making—hinder
the capacity of agencies to respond coherently to the uncertainties of climate
change. Relying on two case studies, this Part also demonstrates that the
challenges of developing more effective regulation are greater than some
advocates of past regulatory reforms have indicated. These proponents of
adaptive and collaborative management experiments have ignored the
challenges of sustained regulatory learning and shared decision making,
seemingly expecting officials to confess mistakes, monitor and adapt
strategies, and collaborate with other agencies despite few resources,
incentives, or opportunities to do so. As a result, even recent experiments
seeking to make governance more adaptive and collaborative have fallen well
short of their promise. Though these limitations may have existed before the
arrival of global warming, the uncertainty raised by climate change makes this

23 An adaptation strategy ―reduces the level of damages that might have otherwise occurred,‖ while
mitigation strategies act to prevent or reduce adverse climatic change, primarily through the abatement of
greenhouse gas emissions. WILLIAM E. EASTERLING III ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
COPING WITH GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES iii (2004); see
also WORKING GROUP II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 869 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC,
ADAPTATION] (defining adaptation as the ―[a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities‖
(emphasis omitted)).
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disjointed and un-adaptive approach to resource management distressingly
untenable.
Part IV details how very few strategies to adapt to climate change
considered by legislatures and agencies in the United States really seek to
reformulate regulatory processes themselves—how we choose among, and
assess the effectiveness of, the many resource management alternatives.
Relying on two case studies at the vanguard of natural resource governance,
Part IV demonstrates how resource agencies largely continue to ignore the
need for the systematic and coordinated collection and analysis of information
about the performance of management decisions and regulatory programs in
implementing regulatory missions.
Finally, Part V explains how the U.S. Congress and the President should
alter domestic natural resources governance to manage the uncertainty of
adapting to climate change.24 This Part details the principal components of a
learning infrastructure, including (1) an adaptive governance framework,
which would require sustained monitoring and adjustment of regulatory
decisions to assess whether such strategies further regulatory goals; and (2) an
information-sharing infrastructure for collecting and circulating scientific data
on natural systems and assessments of management strategies and programs.
In addition, Part V considers ways to alter the incentives for agency officials to
foster agency adaptability and more effective natural resource governance.
Through this approach, the many promising substantive proposals adopted by
resource managers for conserving and restoring natural resources can be
assessed and modified by agencies, legislators, and the public to more directly
advance resource management goals.25
Just as importantly, such an
infrastructure will help cultivate the adaptive capacity to manage the heretofore
unknown upheavals that climate change will bring.

24 This Article‘s primary focus is on domestic natural resource governance in the United States. As such,
it necessarily only briefly discusses the international dimensions of natural resource governance, such as in the
context of case studies on Great Lakes and Colorado River governance. Though outside the scope of this
Article, it bears mentioning that the learning infrastructure advocated herein—in particular the
intergovernmental, information-sharing network—has clear implications for international governance as well.
25 There are a variety of potential normative goals for resource management, such as resource
preservation, restoration, or maximizing ecosystem services. Likewise, an adopted adaptation strategy may
seek to resist or accept climate change, or seek to optimize human or ecological benefits. This Article does not
advocate any particular substantive goal. Instead, it recognizes that such objectives indeed may (and should)
change over time. As such, it contends that the learning infrastructure it proposes provides a superior process
for establishing and promoting management goals compared to existing governance.
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I. THE UNCERTAIN EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Extensive evidence confirms that global climate change is already
occurring and is very likely due to the increase in greenhouse gas
concentrations from human activities.26 The best data suggest that, across a
wide array of future carbon emission scenarios, average global temperatures
will rise between 2 and 11.5 degrees Fahrenheit over the next century,27 though
increases are expected to be even greater over land and closer to the North and
South Poles.28 Virtually all species and ecosystems will be affected by climate
change. Yet the extent of these impending impacts and the exact future
distribution of impacts globally and domestically are far from clear. This is the
core dilemma that natural resource governance must confront if it is going to
successfully manage the effects wrought by climate change.
A. Existing and Projected Effects on U.S. Ecosystems
Although difficult to distinguish from other natural and anthropogenic
phenomena, the speed and severity of some climate change effects on natural
systems can be identified and isolated.29 An increasingly robust level of
scientific data indicates that anthropogenic climate change is already having
substantial detrimental effects on wildlife, vegetation, and ecological
processes.30 Direct effects on species ―have been documented on every
continent, in every ocean, and in most major taxonomic groups,‖31 and
―changes in ice cover, salinity, oxygen levels[,] and circulation‖ have also been
26 See WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 10 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE]
(linking climate change to human activity).
27 See id. at 13.
28 See id. at 16.
29 Cf. Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate Change Impacts
Across Natural Systems, 421 NATURE 37, 37 (2003) (―Causal attribution of recent biological trends to climate
change is complicated because non-climatic influences dominate local, short-term biological changes. Any
underlying signal from climate change is likely to be revealed by analyses that seek systematic trends across
diverse species and geographic regions . . . .‖).
30 See id. (discussing the substantial detrimental effects of climate change); IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE,
supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the effects of climate change); see generally CAMILLE PARMESAN & HECTOR
GALBRAITH, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, OBSERVED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE U.S.
(2004) (reporting the effects of climate change in the United States).
31 Camille Parmesan, Ecological and Evolutionary Responses to Recent Climate Change, 37 ANN. REV.
ECOLOGY, EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 637, 639 (2006); see also IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 8–9
(listing concerns of direct species effects); Boris Worm et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean
Ecosystem Services, 314 SCIENCE 787 (2006) (discussing the overall impact of biodiversity loss on ocean
ecosystems).
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verified.32 Ocean acidification has also been documented.33 The best available
evidence suggests that climate change is already disturbing natural systems in
the United States.34
Changes in U.S. air temperature, precipitation,
snowpack,35 water temperature, wildfire acreage, tree mortality, and water
flow36 are all consistent with climate change. Phenological changes have been
observed in many species,37 between species,38 and throughout entire
communities.39 Species ranges have also shifted.40
Though these extant effects of climate change on ecosystems have been
significant, they are relatively small compared to the speed and severity of
projected effects. Warming of the U.S. climate will very likely continue for
the next twenty-five to fifty years, irrespective of any reductions in future
emissions.41 Though the magnitude of temperature increases is expected to be
32

See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 8.
See id. at 9 (documenting ocean acidification but observing that ―the effects of observed ocean
acidification on the marine biosphere are as yet undocumented‖).
34 See generally THOMAS R. KARL ET AL. EDS., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 9–12 (2009); H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCIENCE, ECON.
AND THE ENV‘T, THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S ECOSYSTEMS 2008: FOCUS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 3–4 (2008)
[hereinafter HEINZ CENTER].
35 PETER BACKLUND ET AL., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ON AGRICULTURE, LAND RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES, AND BIODIVERSITY; SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT
PRODUCT 4.3, 1, 5 (Margaret K. Walsh ed., 2008) [hereinafter USCCSP SAP 4.3].
36 See HEINZ CENTER, supra note 34, at 2–5 (discussing changes in these environmental factors). See
also CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INDICATORS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA ii–iii (Linda Mazur &
Carmen
Milanes
eds.,
2009),
available
at
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/multimedia/epic/pdf/
ClimateChangeIndicatorsApril2009.pdf (reporting decreased spring snowmelt, rising sea levels, and increased
frequency of wildfires in California).
37 See Parmesan, supra note 31, at 643–44 (noting that bloom dates (phytoplankton), flowering dates
(flowers), calling dates (frogs), and spring events (birds) have generally advanced for certain species);
INDICATORS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 36, at 146–66 (reporting accelerated wine grape
blooming and changes in bird, small mammal, and butterfly migration patterns in California).
38 See, e.g., David W. Inouye et al., Climate Change is Affecting Altitudinal Migrants and Hibernating
Species, 97 PROC. OF THE NAT‘L ACAD. OF SCI. 1630, 1632–33 (2000) (discussing climate changes reflected by
Colorado‘s yellow-bellied marmots and their food plants); Monika Winder & Daniel E. Schindler, Climate
Change Uncouples Trophic Interactions in an Aquatic Ecosystem, 85 ECOLOGY 2100, 2102–05 (2004)
(discussing asynchrony between phytoplankton and zooplankton in the northeast United States).
39 See Parmesan, supra note 31, at 643–44 (reviewing various studies of diatoms, freshwater
invertebrates, and shrubs in the Arctic).
40 See Lisa Crozier, Warmer Winters Drive Butterfly Range Expansion by Increasing Survivorship, 85
ECOLOGY 231, 239–40 (2004) (explaining northward movement of sachem skipper butterfly range); Alan T.
Hitch & Paul L. Leberg, Breeding Distributions of North American Bird Species Moving North as a Result of
Climate Change, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 534, 534 (2007) (―As predicted, the northern limit of birds with
a southern distribution showed a significant shift northward (2.35 km/year).‖).
41 See USCCSP SAP 4.3, supra note 35, at 5 (―Warming is very likely to continue in the United States
during the next 25 to 50 years, regardless of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions . . . .‖).
33
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quite problematic,42 it is the speed of such changes that is likely to be the most
damaging to biodiversity.43 U.S. forest, coastal, and freshwater resources are
expected to be particularly impaired,44 with cascading effects on human
health,45 resource production,46 and ecosystem services.47 In Alaska, the very
stability of the land is likely to change.48
B. A Different Order of Uncertainty
Though the best available data strongly indicate progressively severe
effects on natural systems, the primary challenge that climate change posits for
natural resource governance is the extraordinary uncertainty surrounding the
precise manifestation of these impacts. In certain respects, climate change is
similar to other, more conventional natural resource issues. To be sure,
environmental problems are rife with limited information; in fact, some
consider uncertainty to be a fundamental feature of modern environmental
risk.49 Government regulators have long been tasked with addressing problems
for which information as to the generation, transmission, impact, and probable
42

See id. (discussing problems expected to be caused by rising temperatures).
See FRANK R. SPELLMAN, ECOLOGY FOR NONECOLOGISTS 305 (2008) (―[I]t is the predicted rate of
temperature change that poses the greatest threat to biodiversity.‖); Marcel E. Visser, Keeping Up with a
Warming World; Assessing the Rate of Adaptation to Climate Change, 275 PROC. ROYAL SOC‘Y 649, 649
(2008) (―[T]he magnitude of the ecological consequences will strongly depend on the rate of adaptation of
species to their changing environment . . . .‖).
44 See USCCSP SAP 4.3, supra note 35, at 96–97 (projecting greater disturbance to forests from fire,
pestilence, and disease); IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 10–12 (projecting with very high confidence
increased harm to coastal and freshwater resources); PETER C. FRUMHOFF ET AL., CONFRONTING CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE U.S. NORTHEAST: SCIENCE, IMPACTS, AND SOLUTIONS 47 (2007) (estimating a 350 to 500 mile
northward shift for northeastern U.S. trees by the late twenty-first century, threatening birds, lynx, hares, and
other species).
45 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 12 (projecting increased adverse health effects from heat
waves).
46 See id. (projecting harm to fishing industry); HEINZ CENTER, supra note 34, at 3–4 (predicting
increased drought, heat, disease, and pests in some agricultural areas); USCCSP SAP 4.3, supra note 35, at 9
(projecting increased disease and failure in grain and oilseed crops).
47 See generally NAT‘L ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS TEAM, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE
VARIABILITY AND CHANGE (2000) (discussing decreased carbon storage, erosion protection, and water and air
purification due to climate change).
48 See David M. Lawrence et al., Accelerated Arctic Land Warming and Permafrost Degradation During
Rapid Sea Ice Loss, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L11506 (2008) (projecting that rapidly melting sea ice will
lead to permafrost melting in arctic regions of Alaska).
49 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 498–99
(2008) (―Environmental problems typically arise in settings of risk and uncertainty.‖); Talbot Page, A Generic
View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208–09 (1978) (―Ignorance of mechanism is
the first characteristic of environmental risk problems.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
43
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occurrence of hazards is limited.50 As with other environmental problems,
there is imperfect information about many existing effects of climate change
simply because they have yet to be studied.51 Likewise, though knowledge of
future impacts from climate change is as great as it has ever been,52 attempts to
assess future effects must rely on modeling based on a range of assumptions
that are of limited accuracy and precision.
Two fundamental features of climate change set it apart from more
conventional environmental stressors. The first is the nature of the anticipated
disruption. Every ecosystem is subject to periodic disturbances such as
drought, flood, and fire. Even though some of these disruptions may be quite
substantial, they are core features of resilient and dynamic ecosystems.53 In
contrast, the projected scope and severity of global anthropogenic climate
change threatens to compromise the fundamental resilience and existence of
many ecosystems.54 Furthermore, these effects are anticipated to occur at a
speed many times faster than any climatic change human civilization has
encountered.55 The unprecedented speed and type of change make it at best
challenging—if not impossible—to extrapolate from current ecological
knowledge. This uncertainty about the implications for ecosystems globally
raises the stakes to a level much higher than for other environmental problems.
Perhaps more significantly for natural resource governance is the
exceptional uncertainty that arises from any effort toward climate change
adaptation. The global scale and complexity of climate tells part of the story.
Scientists have been relatively effective at predicting macro-trends in variables
such as air temperature, and today‘s models are much more sophisticated than

50 See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 13 (2d ed.
2007) (―In many respects scientific uncertainty is the defining feature of environmental policy.‖).
51 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 9 (―[A]vailable analyses are limited in the number of
systems and locations considered.‖).
52 See id. at 5 (detailing case studies); see also id. at 15 (―Magnitudes of impact can now be estimated
more systematically for a range of possible increases in global average temperature.‖).
53 See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog
Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2008) (―Although all ecosystems undergo disturbance regimes such as flood,
fire, and drought, all of which we have some experience observing and predicting, ecologists understand that
these forms of disturbance are part of the stable disequilibrium of resilient, dynamic ecosystems.‖ (footnote
omitted)).
54 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 11 (―The resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be
exceeded this century by an unprecedented combination of climate change, associated disturbances . . . and
other global change drivers . . . .‖).
55 See Stephen H. Schneider et al., Climate-Change Scenarios for Impact Assessment, in GLOBAL
WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 38, 42 (Robert L. Peters & Thomas E. Lovejoy eds., 1992).
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earlier ones.56 Yet even some fairly recent models of surface temperature and
sea level changes—areas of climate science with the best and most
straightforward data—are already proving somewhat inaccurate.57 This limited
accuracy stems from the multivariate nature of climate. The exact course of
various potentially confounding natural factors58 is unknown; some factors
may be synergistic and nonlinear (i.e., lead to a vicious cycle of warming);59
and some factors become apparent only after additional climatic changes
occur.60 In short, various features of climate dynamics are not well understood
by scientists.
Climate change adaptation raises two further uncertainties. Any efforts to
adapt natural systems to manage the effects of climate change will be
substantially influenced by mitigation activities that abate further climatic
change.61 However, mitigation activities raise their own uncertainties because
they will be carried out by a host of regulatory actors and are likely to change
over time.62
Finally, though modeling for global climate temperatures and sea levels is
already daunting, projections localized to a scale needed to provide practical

56 See WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURE: ADAPTING FOR THE FUTURE 3
(2006) (―New modeling tools and techniques are becoming available that can project potential changes in
species range and distribution on land and at sea.‖).
57 See Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Recent Climate Observations Compared to Projections, 316 SCIENCE 709,
709 (2007) (finding global sea level rise is greater than model predictions, and mean surface temperature rise
is in the far upper range of model predictions).
58 For example, emitted aerosols may counteract warming by deflecting solar radiation, and there is some
evidence that increased forest fires may reduce temperatures in the long-term because of increased surface
reflectivity. See Richard A. Kerr, Another Global Warming Icon Comes Under Attack, 317 SCIENCE 28, 28
(2007); J.T. Randerson et al., The Impact of Boreal Forest Fire on Climate Warming, 314 SCIENCE 1130, 1130
(2006).
59 For example, melting permafrost releases more greenhouse gases that will accelerate warming, leading
to more permafrost melt. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling from Northern Lakes: Present and
Future Contributions to the Global Methane Budget, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC‘Y A 1657, 1657
(2007).
60 Cf. Ruhl, supra note 53, at 19 (―[E]ven as we learn more about the highly coupled, tightly interacting
processes that comprise the climate, the likelihood is that we will realize with even greater clarity that it is
inherently unpredictable.‖).
61 See EASTERLING, supra note 23, at iii. For a discussion of the relationship between climate change
mitigation and adaptation, see Part II.A.
62 Cf. WORKING GROUP III, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (2007) (noting that uncertainty concerning mitigation is reflected in
―ranges of baselines, rates of technological change and other factors that are specific to . . . different
[analytical] approaches,‖ and from ―the limited information for global coverage of countries, sectors and
gases‖).
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aid for adaptation decisions63 are even more troublesome. Localized impacts
of climate change will vary greatly depending on the adaptability of each
ecosystem64 and many non-climate factors.65 As modeling is downscaled to
particular ecosystems, these various additional sources of uncertainty limit the
ability to make projections,66 and small changes in assumptions can lead to
widely varying results.67 These difficulties are made even more challenging
because basic long-term data are lacking for many ecosystems.68 As a result,
existing local modeling is still rare and only provides limited reliable (and
mostly qualitative) information about the effects of climate change on specific
ecosystems.69 So the global scale of the problem, the limited study of effects,
the variety and complex interaction of variables, and the particular difficulties
for localized ecosystem modeling combine to raise uncertainty to a level
humans have never encountered and governments have never attempted to
manage.70
63 See Climate and Land Use Change Effects on Ecological Resources in Three Watersheds: A Synthesis
Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,045, 45,046 (Aug. 10, 2007) (stating the ―[e]ffects of global change drivers differ by
place and in scale, necessitating place-specific impacts information to enable stakeholders to respond
appropriately‖).
64 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 11.
65 These include changes in population, income, technological development, land use, other pollution,
and invasive species. See id. at 20 (―[L]arge differences in regional population, income and technological
development . . . are often a strong determinant of the level of vulnerability to climate change.‖ (citation
omitted)).
66 See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 26, at 74 (―There remain a number of important sources of
uncertainty limiting the ability to project regional climate change. . . . There are some important climate
processes that have a significant effect on regional climate, but for which the climate change response is still
poorly known.‖); IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 9 (―[T]emperature variability is larger at the regional
than at the global scale . . . . [A]t the regional scale other factors (such as land-use change, pollution, and
invasive species) are influential.‖).
67 See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, CLIMATE MODELS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STRENGTHS
AND LIMITATIONS 88 (2008) (―[M]aking different assumptions about the land biosphere within a single model
gave markedly different feedback values.‖). For example, the suitability of habitat for many wetland plant
species can be drastically altered by even minor variations in water availability. See SPELLMAN, supra note
43, at 305.
68 See, e.g., IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 26, at 74 (―For those regions that have strong
topographical controls on their climatic patterns, there is often insufficient climate change information at the
fine spatial resolution of the topography. In some regions there has been only very limited research on
extreme weather events.‖).
69 See Ruhl, supra note 53, at 21 (2008); cf. Jean-Philippe Vidal & Steven D. Wade, Multimodel
Projections of Catchment-Scale Precipitation Regime, 353 J. HYDROLOGY 143, 143 (2008) (―Hydrologists and
water resources planners make use of downscaled climate scenarios, often with little regard for the
performance of scenario construction methods, for informing decisions on water resources and flood risk
management policies and projects.‖).
70 See Ruhl, supra note 53, at 22 (―[C]limate change does not present just another disturbance regime, the
operations of which we can extrapolate from current ecological knowledge; rather, it will be the undoing of
ecosystems as we know them.‖ (footnote omitted)).
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II. ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Exceptional uncertainty is the core challenge that natural resource
governance faces from climate change. Ecologists and other scientists are
being forced to reconsider long-held assumptions and methodologies for
studying natural systems, and agencies are being pressed to prepare for
problems they have never faced before.71 In short, adapting to climate change
necessitates the coordination and mobilization of scientific and management
information to a degree never attempted. To be sure, government institutions
must develop a suite of strategies to both prevent further climatic change and
foster suitable adaptations to its effects on natural and human systems. More
importantly, natural resource governance must develop an infrastructure that
enhances the capacity of public and private actors to assess and manage an
uncertain regulatory environment.
A. The Need for Adaptation
Despite the sizeable uncertainty that accompanies any comprehensive effort
to manage the effects of climate change, climate change adaptation is a vital
complement to mitigation activities that seek to curb further climatic change.
On the one hand, focusing more attention on adaptation should certainly not
supplant vital efforts to abate greenhouse gas emissions. Extensive evidence
compiled by thousands of independent scientists indicates that without swift,
comprehensive efforts to substantially reduce emissions, the effects of climate
change on natural systems will undoubtedly be more severe.72 Indeed, the
many uncertainties and challenges detailed in Part I.B counsel for very robust
abatement restrictions. Emissions reduction through efforts, such as the
currently pending Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act
of 2009,73 that seek a cap-and-trade or emission tax system to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions should not be merely an afterthought, but rather a
vital part of any sensible response to climate change.74

71 See id.; cf. Jonathan Lash & Fred Wellington, Competitive Advantage on a Warming Planet, 85 HARV.
BUS. REV. 95, 96 (2007) (―[C]limate change presents business risks that are different in kind because the
impact is global, the problem is long-term, and the harm is essentially irreversible.‖).
72 COMM. ON ENV‘T & NATURAL RES., NAT‘L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES 77–79 (2008).
73 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (Agreed to on June 26,
2009, placed on Senate Legislative Calendar July 7, 2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h2454eh.txt.pdf.
74 See EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 23, at iii.
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On the other hand, no amount of abatement, even if enacted tomorrow, is
likely to diminish the effects of climate change for several decades. Evidence
suggests that the effects of global warming are already being experienced in
the United States, and climate change is likely to continue for decades, even in
the event of significant reduction of emissions.75 Countless people and
ecosystems are and will continue to be threatened by the effects of climate
change, at least until abatement measures show results.76
Climate change thus will increasingly place considerable stress on the
perpetually limited resources allocated to manage natural resources.
Government institutions must be tactical in trying to expand the capacity to
address existing regulatory vulnerabilities while anticipating and averting
severe climate change effects. Unfortunately, legislators and regulators in the
United States and elsewhere have only begun to consider the role of adaptation
in combating climate change.
B. A Typology of Government Adaptation Strategies
Greater attention must be given to reducing the existing and future adverse
effects of climate change on natural resources. To advance this endeavor, this
section proposes a framework for classifying government adaptation measures
according to three particularly relevant parameters: (1) whether the adaptation
primarily anticipates or reacts to effects from climate change; (2) whether the
strategy focuses exclusively, partially, or only indirectly on projected climate
change effects; and (3) whether the strategy is a ―substantive‖ response to the
direct effects of climate change, or an indirect ―procedural‖ adaptation of a
process for deciding among substantive adaptations. All of these government
strategies likely have a role to play in any comprehensive approach to climate
change adaptation. However, as detailed here, the uncertainty attributable to
climate change, and the inevitable scarcity of resources allocated for natural
resource governance, counsel for an emphasis on proactive, procedural
strategies directed at addressing existing key regulatory vulnerabilities likely to
be exacerbated by climate change. Such strategies can provide a basis for

75

See USCCSP SAP 4.3, supra note 35, at 3.
This is likely to be especially true for particularly vulnerable persons or nations, including low-income
communities or developing regions of the world. See NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 92 (2006).
76
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government regulators to manage uncertainty and reduce the risk of regulatory
waste.77
1. Proactive and Reactive Strategies
The timing of an adaptation‘s implementation is likely to have significant
repercussions on the cost and success of the strategy.78 A proactive adaptation
―takes place before impacts of climate change are observed.‖79 Such strategies
seek to formulate long-term strategies for infrastructure, education, outreach,
and improving collective capacities to adapt, as well as create incentives to
change behaviors suited to the shifting climate.80 However, such strategies are
susceptible to the considerable uncertainty inherent in predictive modeling.
Therefore, to be successful, proactive strategies must be designed to adapt to a
range of possible effects and must be nimble enough to respond to new
information obtained during implementation.81
In contrast, a reactive adaptation is ―a deliberate response to a climatic
shock or impact, in order to recover and prevent similar impacts in the

77 Though not the focus of this Article, it should be noted that not all adaptations must be governmental.
Certainly, private actors are already adapting to climate change. See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at
636 (noting ski resorts building lifts to accommodate higher altitudes and discussing farmers and timber
companies adjusting crop varieties). In addition, private markets can increase adaptive capacity by creating
incentives to adapt, with private insurance as a prominent example. See STERN, supra note 76, at 412
(―[B]etter developed insurance markets would help to create clear price signals . . . about the risks associated
with climate change.‖). Indeed, some insurers have already adjusted prices to encourage climate change loss
and hazard prevention. See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 636. Nonetheless, private markets are
limited in their ability to foster efficient adaptations because (1) they are also subject to the uncertainties of
climate change; (2) markets may be missing or misaligned; and (3) participants in markets must deal with
financial constraints. See STERN, supra note 76, at 411–12 (―Uncertainty in climate change projections could
therefore act as a significant impediment to [private] adaptation.‖). As such, the role of public governance can
be understood as not only to enhance the adaptive capacity of private markets (cultivating the informational,
regulatory, institutional, and managerial conditions needed to support private adaptation) but also to implement
government adaptation strategies for reducing vulnerability where market responses are likely to be
insufficient. See generally id. at 404–47 (discussing the role of government adaptation responses in addressing
the effects of climate change).
78 EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 23, at vi, 14.
79 IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 869 (emphasis omitted); see also JILL S. BARON ET AL., U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE
ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES glossary at 1 (Susan Herrod Julius & Jordan M. West eds., 2008) [hereinafter
USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS] (defining ―anticipatory adaptation‖ as ―that [which] takes place before
impacts of climate change are observed‖).
80 See EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 23, at vi.
81 See, e.g., id. at 24.
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future.‖82 Such strategies have the key inherent advantage of being subject to
less uncertainty, as they are only implemented in response to actualized risks.83
However, various intrinsic problems exist with reactive approaches. Because
they are only implemented after-the-fact, ―a high degree of ecosystem and
infrastructure damage is likely to occur before reactive measures are taken.‖84
Due to ―inefficiencies in the response when it is needed, wasted investments
made in ignorance of future conditions, or potentially even greater damages
because precautionary actions were not taken,‖85 reactive adaptations may be
more vulnerable to higher long-term administrative costs and damages.86 The
limitations of reactive strategies are particularly problematic when addressing
high-cost or irreversible impacts of long-term and expensive investments., or
when otherwise important to prevent (and not merely respond to) climate
effects.87 Unfortunately, such circumstances are quite common in the context
of climate change, particularly in the context of threats to certain biological
resources.88
Thus, in adapting to the effects of climate change on ecological resources it
is better to prevent negative consequences by employing proactive adaptations
based on the precautionary principle.89 Reactive adaptations should be left to
circumstances in which proactive strategies were unsuccessful in identifying
and preventing a hazard from occurring.90 Establishing a systematic approach
for cultivating successful proactive adaptations is thus crucial to developing
effective adaptation strategies.

82 JANET ABRAMOVITZ ET AL., WORLD CONSERVATION UNION ET AL., ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE:
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND VULNERABILITY REDUCTION 10 (2001).
83 See Linda A. Joyce et al., National Forests, in USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 79, at 40.
84 See Margaret A. Palmer et al., Wild and Scenic Rivers, in USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note
79, at 33.
85 See Joyce et al., supra note 83, at 40.
86 See EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 23, at ii. For example, reactive strategies such as ecosystem
restoration to pre-event conditions can be wasteful if they do not integrate proactive planning for future
conditions. See id. at 5.
87 See id. at 24.
88 See id. at 4 (―A ‗wait-and-see‘ approach would be particularly unsuccessful in coping
with . . . [i]rreversible impacts, such as species extinction or unrecoverable ecosystem changes
[and] . . . [u]nacceptably high costs and damages, such as inappropriate coastal zone development that exposes
lives and property to intense storm damages . . . .‖).
89 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 246.
90 Cf. Palmer et al., supra note 84, at 33 (―[A] reactive approach is not the most desirable response
strategy to climate change . . . .‖).
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2. Exclusive, Co-benefit, or No-Regret Strategies
Another variable for distinguishing among adaptation strategies emphasizes
the orientation of the adaptation in terms of the benefit provided. Exclusive
adaptations are directed exclusively at reducing the effects of climate change.
A co-benefit strategy is in part directed at reducing vulnerabilities related to
climate change but is also expected to produce other public benefits.91 Noregrets adaptations are directed at providing net benefits irrespective of the
effects of climate change.92
Due to existing uncertainties about such effects, prudent regulators should
seek to maximize the use of no-regrets adaptations.93 No-regrets strategies
reduce the risks of regulatory waste from uncertainty because they are a net
benefit to their particular natural and/or regulatory system regardless of
whether (or to what extent) the projected effects of climate change occur.
However, given the magnitude and speed of impacts anticipated by climate
change, it is doubtful that reliance on no-regrets strategies alone could forestall
all the heretofore unknown effects of climate change.94 Because the exact
effects of climate change remain uncertain, regulators also should seek to
adopt partial or co-benefit adaptations that maximize supplementary public
benefits in order to minimize the risks from costly adaptations. Only as a
precaution against particularly large or catastrophic risks should regulators
consider employing exclusive adaptations that lack other public benefits.
3. Substantive and Procedural Strategies
In classifying potential adaptation strategies, perhaps the most important
distinction is one that has not been identified in the scientific or legal literature:
whether the adaptation is primarily a substantive or procedural strategy. This
91 ABRAMOVITZ ET AL., supra note 82, at 10–11. One example might be the conservation of natural
buffer systems to minimize the effects of climate change, which some claim would have the additional benefits
of enhancing biodiversity conservation and economic productivity, as well as alleviating poverty more
effectively. See id. at 28.
92 See id. at 10 (describing decreasing ―vulnerability to current climate-related variability and extremes,
such as through flood-control structures, most likely also reducing vulnerability to shifts in risk due to climate
change‖ (footnote omitted)).
93 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 246.
94 See, e.g., Harriet Bulkeley, No Regrets? Economy and Environment in Australia‟s Domestic Climate
Change Policy Process, 11 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 155, 167 (2001) (concluding with regard to Australia‘s
experience implementing no-regrets climate change adaptations that ―while following the path of no-regrets
may provide short-term compromises, in itself it does not offer an escape route from fundamental conflicts
between economic goals and environmental objectives . . . .‖).
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distinction considers whether the strategy principally seeks to address the
direct effects of climate change (substantive), or to change a process for
deciding among substantive adaptations (procedural).
a. Substantive Governmental Strategies
Most of the strategies mentioned by natural resource managers and
discussed in the growing scholarly literature on climate change adaptation are
substantive. For example, many proposed adaptations focus on altering the
environment to minimize the direct effects of sea level rise and severe weather
events such as storm intensity, floods, and droughts.95 These sorts of direct,
discrete adaptations, such as physical removal of invasive species or
construction of breakwaters, rock sills, levees, or dams,96 tend to be reactive.97
Other substantive adaptations seek to alter the way private actors interact
with the immediate environment to reduce the effect of climate change, often
through the disclosure of information or changes to regulations that encourage
or mandate particular private conduct. For example, regulatory adaptations
that address increased risks to coastal resources could include (1) public
information disclosure or education initiatives regarding flood risk;98 (2) early
warning systems;99 (3) changes to government flood insurance;100 (4)
subsidies101 or changes to zoning or building codes102 to increase the capacity
95

See Susan Herrod Julius et al., Introduction, in USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 79, at 7–
10; IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 247.
96 See Jill S. Baron et al., National Parks, in USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 79, at 14; J.
Michael Scott et al., National Wildlife Refuges, in USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 79, at 42;
Palmer et al., supra note 84, at 14–15, 31; Charles H. Peterson et al., National Estuaries, in USCCSP,
ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 79, at 40. Other examples include shore land conservation, erosion
controls, and lower-level tear-away walls on structures. See EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 23, at 27–28.
97 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 636. For example, the State of Alaska, where coastal
villages are falling into the ocean as protective sea ice melts, has pledged $11 million for coastal village
protection primarily through strengthening sea walls. Tom Kizzia, State Puts Erosion on Priority List—
COASTAL VILLAGES: The Goal Is to Attract Additional Federal Aid by Allocating Control-Project Money,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 12, 2008, at A1.
98 IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 636.
99 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UNCERTAINTY IN ANALYZING CLIMATE CHANGE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 36
(2005).
100 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 636 (―The U.S. National Flood Insurance Program is
changing its policy to reduce the risk of multiple flood claims, which cost the programme more than US $200
million/yr. Households with two flood-related claims are now required to elevate their structure 2.5 cm above
the 100-year flood level, or relocate.‖ (citation omitted)).
101 Robert Knox, Mass. Urges Owners on Coast to Elevate Homes: Storms and Rising Seas Pose Threat
to Properties, BOSTON GLOBE, May 24, 2008, at B1 (noting that the Federal Emergency Management Agency
will partially subsidize elevation of private homes).
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of private property to withstand climate events;103 (5) modifications to permit
programs to reduce coastal erosion, such as prohibitions on private seawalls;104
or (6) relocations of private structures from flood-prone areas through
government acquisition.105
On a larger scale, substantive adaptations also include agency management
planning, varying from site-specific to program-wide plans. An example of a
program-wide plan is EPA‘s new National Water Strategy, which seeks to
modify EPA‘s water programs to address climate change effects.106 As
adaptation strategies necessarily are specific to their application, the list of
potential discrete or concrete strategies for any particular plan may be
extensive.107 Management planning strategies being considered include the
creation of additional protected areas,108 wildlife corridors,109 and replicate
ecosystems;110 increased protection of vulnerable genotypes, species, and
communities;111 ecosystem restoration;112 and ―assisted migration‖ of
species.113

102

EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 23, at 26.
AJAY MATHUR ET AL., WORLD BANK, AN ADAPTATION MOSAIC: A SAMPLE OF THE EMERGING WORLD
BANK IN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 12 (2004).
104 See James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and
Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1313 (1998).
105 EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 23, at 27 (explaining New Jersey‘s coastal land acquisition program,
Rhode Island‘s prohibition on seawalls, and Texas‘ rolling easements).
106 See generally U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF WATER, NATIONAL WATER PROGRAM STRATEGY: RESPONSE TO
CLIMATE CHANGE (2008).
107 For example, a single management plan for a National Wildlife Refuge may involve, among other
strategies, prescribed burning to manage wildfires, removal of dispersal barriers to promote species range
expansion and migration, habitat restoration, and sustaining migrant organisms struggling in their new habitat.
Scott et al., supra note 96, at 30–31.
108 See, e.g., Lee Hannah et al., Protected Area Needs in a Changing Climate, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY &
ENV‘T 131, 135 (2007) (finding that ―protected areas are a useful conservation response to climate change‖).
109 See, e.g., Paul Williams et al., Planning for Climate Change: Identifying Minimum-Dispersal
Corridors for the Cape Proteaceae, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1063, 1064 (2005) (devising a quantitative
method for identifying conservation corridors that allow species the flexibility needed to adapt to shifting
habitats as a result of climate change).
110 See, e.g., Julius et al., supra note 95, at 2 (―Replication centers on maintaining more than one example
of each ecosystem or population such that if one area is affected by a disturbance, replicates in another area
provide insurance against extinction and a source for recolonization of affected areas.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
111 See, e.g., Peter Kareiva et al., Synthesis and Conclusions, in USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra
note 79, at 2 (recommending an increased representation of different genotypes, species, and communities
under protection).
112 Id. at 20–21.
113 See, e.g., Jason S. McLachlan et al., A Framework for Debate of Assisted Migration in an Era of
Climate Change, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 297 (2007) (discussing deliberate relocation of organisms to
new habitats as climate changes).
103
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b. Procedural Governmental Strategies
Though most commenters have focused on substantive strategies that seek
to minimize or reverse the adverse effects of climate change on natural
systems, the most crucial adaptations may take the more indirect form of
procedural governmental strategies.
Rather than focusing on directly
managing the effects of climate change—or the natural systems or human
conduct that may exacerbate such effects—this category is intended to
encompass strategies that manage the regulatory programs and processes that
develop more direct strategies. Such approaches might seek to change the
decision-making process officials use to select direct adaptation strategies. At
their broadest level, such approaches might also seek a more fundamental
transformation of the government institutions society relies on to manage
natural resources. For example, procedural adaptation strategies should be
created to flexibly manage the considerable uncertainty surrounding climate
change to avert and minimize the harm from mistakes throughout the
regulatory process.
The concept of ―adaptive management‖ was originally proposed by
scientists in the 1970s who sought a more effective approach to natural
resource management in response to the significant uncertainty that regularly
exists in ecosystems.114 This increasingly influential model seeks to address
information gaps in management plans that surface during plan formation by
including systematic monitoring procedures for obtaining more data to adjust
the management strategies during implementation.115
At the broadest level, procedural adaptation strategies may also include
large-scale modifications to governance—that is, how regulators manage the
programs that govern natural systems and how societies manage these
regulators. Such approaches might include wholesale changes to existing
statutory regimes or programs, the creation of new programs or agencies, or
other fundamental changes to decision-making processes for regulating or
managing natural resources.116 A few observers have discussed the need to
114 See C.S. HOLLING, The Spruce Budworm/Forest-Management Problem, in ADAPTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 143, 156 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); CARL WALTERS,
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986).
115 See Camacho I, supra note 14, at 330–31.
116 For example, one scholar claims that the protection of individual species could be better facilitated by
incorporating biological and long-term planning considerations more directly in decision-making processes
under the ESA. See Carol A. Bloomgarden, Protecting Endangered Species Under Future Climate Change:
From Single-Species Preservation to an Anticipatory Policy Approach, 19 ENVTL. MGMT. 641, 645 (1995).
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make systemic or large-scale governance changes to respond to climate
change.117 Yet, as detailed in Part IV, few recognize the need to increase the
adaptive capacity of natural resource programs and governance to manage the
uncertainty that climate change brings.
C. The Value of Procedural Strategies
Though the value of direct substantive adaptations may be more apparent in
comprehensive attempts to address the effects of climate change, a central
assertion of this Article is that procedural strategies that transform existing
approaches to natural resource governance are even more vital given the
uncertainties that exist for addressing the impacts of a warming climate. For
all the reasons that apply regarding the effects from climate change,118
substantive government adaptations—and in particular those seeking to
regulate or manage ecosystems—are subject to the uncertainties of climate
change as impact models are downscaled to specific locations.119 This
uncertainty is compounded by the limited information that exists regarding the
suitability and efficacy of possible adaptation strategies. For example, captive
breeding and assisted migration strategies are less likely to work if climate
change effects are rapid120 or substantial,121 yet the speed and magnitude of
change are largely unknown for particular ecosystems. This uncertainty is
again amplified because analyses of such strategies are rare, particularly in
response to climate change, and protocols identifying when such strategies
may be appropriate often do not exist.122 Additionally, some strategies are
likely to conflict with other conservation methods or resource uses,123 and the
optimal reconciliation of such conflicts is debatable.
However, uncertainty over the exact future consequences and optimal
substantive strategies should not lead to the conclusion that regulators and the
public can afford to neglect adaptation. As is often the case when inexorable
uncertainty exists in assessing long-term environmental harms,124 the key
question is not whether something should be done. Indeed, the United States is
117

See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.
119 See Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 13.
120 IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 247.
121 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY 41 (Habiba
Gitay et al. eds., 2002).
122 See McLachlan et al., supra note 113, at 297.
123 See id.
124 See supra note 49.
118

2009]

ADAPTING GOVERNANCE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

25

already investing enormously in climate change adaptation, though most of
these costs are not counted as such because they are treated as facets of more
conventional management activities, such as drought relief or storm damage
recovery,125 and are aimed at problems such as water resource planning for
which climate change is only one stressor.126 The key question is, based on the
best available data, what strategies are likely to be most effective and cost
efficient at averting or minimizing potential damage from climate change.127
Procedural strategies can serve as the crucial bridge between uncertainty
and the need for adaptation. Designed properly, such strategies are crucial for
helping managers and regulators manage the substantial uncertainty about both
the effects of climate change and the efficacy and side effects of substantive
adaptation responses. Furthermore, larger-scale governance strategies can be
cultivated that seek to create and disseminate information to regulatory actors,
stakeholders, and the public to minimize uncertainty about climate change
effects, substantive adaptations, and smaller-scale procedural adaptations.128
Procedural strategies can thus serve to strengthen the adaptability of existing
processes and help avoid and adjust over- and under-regulation in response to
climate change.
III. THE POOR ADAPTIVE CAPACITY OF EXISTING GOVERNANCE
A baseline assessment of the state of natural resource governance is
essential for understanding the range of adaptation strategies that may be both
necessary and effective for addressing the effects of climate change. Do
existing programs exert sufficient pressure on regulators and managers to
systematically assess management approaches and manage uncertainty? If not,
do emerging adaptation strategies seek to alter the existing regulatory
infrastructure to provide private and public actors the capacity and incentive to
respond adeptly to climate change?
Unfortunately, existing governance in the United States is fragmented,
poorly informed, and un-adaptive; thus, it is inadequately suited to deal with
125 For example, funding or management of water, coastal, or forest resources as responses to drought,
storm, or fire events, respectively, may in fact be climate change adaptations. See, e.g., Kareiva et al., supra
note 111, at 2–4 (―Many adaptation approaches . . . are already being used to address a variety of other
environmental stressors . . . .‖).
126 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 719.
127 See EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 23, at iii.
128 See infra Part V.
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the effects of climate change. As a result, climate change has been neglected,
and most existing state and federal regulatory programs are ill-prepared to
adapt to the direct effects of climate change. Agency reforms that seek to
make the regulatory process more collaborative and adaptive have fallen short
of their potential. Such experiments neither adopt a shared, adaptive
infrastructure for managing and regulating agency actions nor provide agency
officials or stakeholders sufficient incentives to learn from and adapt
management decisions. To illustrate these contentions, this Part relies on two
case studies of ecosystem governance in the United States. Though by no
means exhaustive, these case studies demonstrate that without fundamental
realignment, existing regulatory regimes appear ill-equipped to address the
strain and uncertainty accompanying climate change.
A. Natural Resource Governance Is Fragmented
As U.S. environmental law has ripened over the past few decades, most
ecological communities have become subject to a clutter of government
programs with limited jurisdiction and information and thus limited capacity to
learn and adapt. Even more recent collaborative experiments have very poorly
developed frameworks for collecting and sharing information. Though there
may be advantages to fragmented and concurrent authority, so far such
fragmentation has not facilitated either inter-governmental learning or the
development of responses to large-scale problems. As a result of these
shortcomings, natural resource regulators and managers have been slow to
respond to the need for comprehensive adaptation to climate change.
1. Existing Fragmentation Impedes Adaptation
Though natural resource agencies are often created with limited authority to
regulate or manage a particular resource problem, over time natural systems in
the United States have become subject to a patchwork of piecemeal regulation.
In fact, Professor William Buzbee has catalogued the regulatory fragmentation
that pervades governmental resource management using taxonomic
classifications such as vertical,129 horizontal,130 institutional,131 and
129

William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and the Challenges of
Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 344 (2005) [hereinafter Buzbee I] (―Vertical fragmentation refers to the
division of regulatory turf among layers of political actors and regulators. . . . [I]n most complex regulatory
settings, federal, state and local officials play roles, with each further handing authority down to administrative
agencies and sometimes citizens.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
130 Id. at 347 (describing horizontal fragmentation as ―each actor having a different subject matter turf‖).
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temporal.132 Even individual agencies are regularly fragmented into fairly
autonomous divisions or regional offices.133 This broad fragmentation has
both impeded concerted agency action for adapting to climate change and
created significant barriers for agency learning.
While some scholars have delineated the benefits of a regulatory system
with decentralized and redundant regulatory authority,134 various weaknesses
have also been identified,135 including how fragmentation can lead to a failure
by regulators to effectively address broadly dispersed resource issues such as
global climate change.136 Professor Buzbee has detailed this often overlooked
―regulatory commons‖137 problem:
Even where a social ill is widely recognized, the existence of
multiple potential regulators will create predictable incentives for
regulatory inattention. Especially where the causes of an ill cross
jurisdictional borders, the harms themselves cross borders, and there
is vertical or horizontal fragmentation of potential regulatory turfs,
138
incentives for regulatory inattention are strong.

Adaptation to climate change serves as a prime example of such a
regulatory commons.139 Though the considerable effects of climate change are
widely recognized, its causes and harms cross jurisdictional borders, and there
131 Id. at 348 (―Institutional fragmentation relates to how different types of legal or regulatory institutions
play roles. . . . [D]iverse institutions such as legislatures, agencies, courts and legally empowered citizens all
typically can play key roles in major regulatory actions.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
132 Id. at 342 (―Temporal fragmentation refers to how regulatory procedures and decisions are spread in a
sequence over a lengthy period of time.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
133 See Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to Conform with the New
American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 11–12 (1998) (describing intra-agency fragmentation
at EPA and state environmental agencies).
134 For more detailed discussion of the disadvantages and opportunities of fragmented governance, see
infra notes 375–83 and accompanying text.
135 For example, various scholars have focused on the potential for overregulation in situations where
―numerous regulators are confronted with a more particularized project or proposal with localized and
discernible effects . . . .‖ Buzbee I, supra note 129, at 349. See also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon,
Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11–12 (2000); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 251–52 (1995).
136 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Massive Problems in the Administrative State: Strategies for
Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1280896
(discussing agency reticence to address complex problems, which, by their nature, cannot be completely
addressed under the jurisdiction of a single agency).
137 William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 5–6 (2003) [hereinafter Buzbee II].
138 Buzbee I, supra note 129, at 356 (citations omitted).
139 Cf. Buzbee II, supra note 137, at 11–14 (explaining how mitigating global climate change presents
regulatory commons challenges).
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is widespread regulatory fragmentation.140 In such a splintered regulatory
setting, private demands for government action are split among various
potential regulators. Regulators who act early are likely to receive diluted
credit as other regulators free ride on their efforts while status quo biases and
risk aversion create additional incentives for regulatory inaction.141 Regulators
thus have little incentive to devote resources to gather information on—or
regulate the risks of—global climate change.
Consequently, it is unsurprising that various observers have concluded that
the U.S. and its regulatory programs are unprepared for the effects of climate
change.142 Thorough analyses of possible adaptations are growing in number
but are still scarce and limited.143 Some natural resource regulators claim to be
in the process of considering strategies for adapting to climate change, but few
agencies have adopted any adaptations.144 Even in recent regulatory actions,
many agencies simply ignore climate change,145 with at least some agency
officials claiming that, because of their limited jurisdiction, they have
insufficient information or capacity to respond.146
140 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 99, at 36 (noting that adaptation policies are more difficult to
implement than mitigation strategies at the federal level because they involve multiple policies and areas of
government); Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 825, 861 (2008) (stating that due to fragmented water resource management, ―problems such
as . . . climate change are arising that no entity has sufficient regulatory authority to comprehensively or
coherently address‖).
141 See Buzbee II, supra note 137, at 30–36.
142 See, e.g., IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 15 (finding that current capacity for adaptation in the
United States is uneven and readiness for increased exposure is low); U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
CLIMATE CHANGE, AGENCIES SHOULD DEVELOP GUIDANCE FOR ADDRESSING THE EFFECTS ON FEDERAL LAND
AND WATER RESOURCES 156 (2007) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (noting that budget cuts and loss of research
stations pose ―challenges to conducting the research necessary for appropriate decision making relating to
climate change issues‖); STERN, supra note 76, at 92 (―[L]ittle can now be done to change the likely adverse
effects that some developing countries will face in the next few decades, and so some adaptation will be
essential.‖).
143 IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 719. See also Bruce Stutz, Adaptation Emerges as Key Part of
Any Climate Change Plan, YALE ENVIRONMENT360 (May 26, 2009), available at http://e360.yale.edu/content/
feature.msp?id=2156 (―[A]daptation strategies are only beginning to be developed, mainly because there‘s
precious little science on adaptation and few working models.‖).
144 See infra Part IV.A for a more detailed discussion of government adaptation strategies.
145 See, e.g., Policy on Wilderness Stewardship, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,876 (Nov. 17, 2008) (failing to mention
climate change in new FWS guidance for recommending additional wilderness designations to Congress).
146 See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 142, at 156, 159, 163, 167 (conveying comments by various
officials regarding their agencies‘ limited capacity to respond to climate change); Constance I. Millar et al.,
Tahoe National Forest, in USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 79, at 9 (―Fragmentation and
inflexibility result from partitioning [Tahoe National Forest] into small management units; small unit sizes also
restrict the capacity for full understanding of ongoing dynamics and process.‖); Kareiva et al., supra note 111,
at 30 (―National wildlife refuges and wild and scenic rivers are subject to water regulation by other agencies or
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2. Existing Fragmentation Impedes Agency Learning
Though these delays undoubtedly can be attributed in part to a lack of
political will, agency inaction is also fundamentally a consequence of the
significant barriers to agency learning created by fragmented governance that
aggravates the enormous uncertainty with which such agencies must cope.
Agency officials do not have the systemic capacity to learn readily from
analyses of potential effects or management strategies employed by other
agencies, or even those strategies employed by other offices or divisions in the
same agency.147 Because most agencies lack sufficient information about the
localized effects of climate change and potential adaptation strategies—or even
the resources and technical capacity to generate such data—it is unsurprising
that most agencies believe they do not have the capacity for long-term
comprehensive adaptation.148 Faced with more obtrusive, short-range threats
and limited information about the effects and relative benefits of different
approaches, managers ignore climate change adaptation completely or adopt
piecemeal adaptations only in response to concrete risks while calling for more
information before acting comprehensively.
In response to these incentives and effects of regulatory fragmentation,
increasing numbers of scholars and regulatory actors are calling for substantial
changes in natural resource governance. Though eliminating fragmentation
may often be implausible and undesirable,149 numerous scholars have
emphasized the need for agencies to create linkages with other regulators to
reduce the effects of fragmentation.150
In recognizing that resource

entities. This fragmented jurisdiction means that collaboration among agencies is required so that they are all
working toward common goals using common management approaches . . . [but] formal co-management
remains the exception, not the rule.‖).
147 See, e.g., Camacho I, supra note 14, at 341 (―[T]here is no comprehensive network to facilitate the
dissemination of . . . information in other than a haphazard, and likely inefficient, way. . . . [N]egotiation and
implementation are conducted by regional and field offices without any centralized or even decentralized
coordination. Moreover, the high turnover of [FWS] staff exacerbates this fragmentation problem by further
limiting the ability to draw on prior experience. As such, there is at best limited cross-pollination of
data . . . and certainly far less than could occur.‖ (citations omitted)); Bradley Karkkainen, “New Governance”
in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV.
471, 495 (2004) [hereinafter Karkkainen II] (―[R]esponsibility for negotiating HCPs and enforcing their terms
was a responsibility assigned to regional and field offices, each operating largely by its own lights.‖).
148 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 375–383 and accompanying text for more detailed discussion of the advantages of
fragmented governance.
150 See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY
OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP (1998) (providing recommendations for fostering interagency
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management inevitably requires consideration of connected ecosystem
components, some scholars and agencies151 have called for the development of
networks of regulatory programs and ultimately management that is focused on
particular ecosystems or landscapes.152 Though collaborative management is
still the exception and not the rule,153 a number of inter-jurisdictional
governance regimes have been created.154 Properly structured, innovations that
promote information pooling and inter-jurisdictional communication might
enrich agency decision making and decrease incentives for regulatory inaction.
3. Lessons from the Great Lakes
Unfortunately, existing experiments have failed to develop and support a
system for interaction and information sharing that facilitates inter-agency
learning. The following case study on Great Lakes governance serves as an
archetypical illustration of the fragmentation that exists in natural resource
regulation. It demonstrates the impediments to climate change adaptation
caused by divided authority and the failure to develop useful interjurisdictional networks despite longstanding recognition of the negative effects
of fragmented governance.
With ninety percent of the U.S. and eighteen percent of the global
freshwater supply, the Great Lakes are the largest surface freshwater system on
the planet,155 and they support considerable economic activity.156 The Great
collaboration); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 136, at 41–45 (discussing a system of ―weak ties‖ for alleviating
the effects of fragmentation).
151 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Ecosystem Protection Workgroup, Toward a Place-Driven Approach: The
Edgewater Consensus on an EPA Strategy for Ecosystem Protection (March 15, 1994), in JOHN COPELAND
NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 384, 384–85 (2d ed. 2006);
Peterson et al., supra note 96, at 51 (explaining that ecosystem-based management ―is designed to
bring . . . disparate groups together to achieve the integration and coordination of efforts‖).
152 See, e.g., Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on
the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665 (1996); R. Edward
Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27 (1994); Karkkainen I, supra note
14, at 1439–42 (explaining ―ecosystem management‖ and ―place-based‖ integrated management).
153 See Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 30 (―Although such collaboration does occur, formal comanagement remains the exception, not the rule.‖).
154 For notable examples, see Natural Community Conservation Planning Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§§ 2800-2835 (West 2009); California Bay-Delta Authority (CBDA), http://calwater.ca.gov/calfed/oversight/
CBDA/index.html (last visited July 3, 2009); Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/index.
aspx (last visited July 3, 2009). For additional examples, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem
Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 217–18 (2002) [hereinafter
Karkkainen III].
155 See Great Lakes Envtl. Research Lab., Nat‘l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., About Our Great Lakes:
Great Lakes Basin Facts, http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/pr/ourlakes/facts.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
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Lakes are currently impaired by a number of environmental stressors,157 and
climate change will likely exacerbate these considerable threats. The region is
especially vulnerable to climate change because of long water retention times
and the relatively small drainage basin.158 Scientists project appreciable
increases in air and water temperature and evaporation;159 decreases in water
levels,160 water quality,161 wetland number and function,162 and forest area;163
and substantial increases in demand for water nationally.164 Species ranges
and the timing of biological events are also expected to change substantially.165

156 See id. (reporting the $4 billion fishing industry, 1,270 miles of commercial shipping routes, and 90%
of iron ore and 58% of automobile production in the United States and Canada associated with the Great
Lakes); GEORGE W. KLING ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS & ECOLOGICAL SOC‘Y OF AM.,
CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 8 (2003) (reporting almost $2 trillion in
regional production in 2000).
157 These include water pollution, invasive species, changing precipitation and evapotranspiration levels,
and rising water temperature. GOV‘T OF CAN. & U.S. EPA, The Great Lakes Today: Concerns, in THE GREAT
LAKES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS AND RESOURCE BOOK (3d ed. 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/
glnpo/atlas/glat-ch4.html#4; NOAH D. HALL ET AL., NAT‘L WILDLIFE FED‘N, CLIMATE CHANGE AND GREAT
LAKES WATER RESOURCES 7 (2007) (detailing precipitation and evapotranspiration projections); LINDA
MORTSCH ET AL., GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BD. OF THE INT‘L JOINT COMM‘N, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
WATER QUALITY IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION: RISKS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND RESPONSES 5 (2003) (describing
water temperature increase from 1895 to 1999 of nearly double the national average). Water and wetland
levels are also declining. GREAT LAKES COMM‘N, WETLANDS RESTORATION: REGIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE
GREAT LAKES 1 (2007) (noting that well over half the Basin‘s historic wetlands have disappeared); Cynthia E.
Sellinger et al., Recent Water Level Declines in the Lake Michigan-Huron System, 42 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 367,
367 (2008) (finding Lakes Michigan and Huron have fallen approximately 3.6 feet since 1997). The Basin is
also home to a number of endangered species. See U.S. EPA ET AL., Case Study—Great Lakes and Upper
Midwest, in CLIMATE CHANGE, WILDLIFE, AND WILDLANDS 2, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/
downloads/CS_glum.pdf (last visited May 9, 2009) (discussing the endangered lynx, gray wolf, and peregrine
falcon).
158 See E. McBean & H. Motiee, Assessment of Impact of Climate Change on Water Resources: A Long
Term Analysis of the Great Lakes of North America, 12 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI. 239, 239–40 (2008).
159 See, e.g., MORTSCH ET AL., supra note 157, at 5, 34, 38 (projecting air temperature increase as high as
9º F and mean annual lake surface evaporation increase of 39%).
160 See, e.g., Brent M. Lofgren et al., Evaluation of Potential Impacts on Great Lakes Water Resources
Based on Climate Scenarios of Two GCMs, 28 J. GREAT LAKES RES. 537, 537 (2002) (projecting water level
drop in Lakes Michigan and Huron of up to 4.5 feet).
161 See MORTSCH ET AL., supra note 157, at 51–64 (expecting disappearance of small lakes and increase in
summer algae, waterborne diseases, and water quality violations).
162 See id. at 64–65 (stating changing climate will alter wetland flushing, sedimentation, nutrient input,
and ice cover duration).
163 See U.S. EPA, supra note 157, at 6 (noting projections of as much as a 70% decline in Great Lakes
forests in the next four decades).
164 See IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 14 (stating mountains in the western United States will
experience ―decreased snowpack, more winter flooding, and reduced summer flows, exacerbating competition
for over-allocated water resources‖).
165 See, e.g., KLING ET AL., supra note 156, at 45 (stating conservative projections indicate 19–39%
decline in ducks and 29% net loss in forest bird diversity by 2030s).
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Yet most scientists concede there is tremendous uncertainty about the precise
location, type, and extent of these local effects.166 Without a regulatory system
that manages uncertainty effectively, such abrupt climate change could prove
catastrophic.
a. A Fragmented Regulatory Patchwork
An astonishing number of government programs have been created to
address these stressors on the natural resources of the Great Lakes, but this
broad assortment of institutions lacks the infrastructure for managing the
uncertainties of climate change. In addition to the many local, state, and
provincial programs that address water use and environmental protection,167
efforts by the governments of Canada and the United States are staggeringly
numerous and fragmented. In the United States alone, more than 148 different
federal programs involving ten federal agencies manage natural resources in
the Great Lakes Basin.168
Due in large part to this piecemeal regulatory approach, various regional
and international regimes of limited jurisdiction have arisen. The International
Joint Commission (IJC) created by the Boundary Waters Treaty169 has narrow
authority to monitor and research air quality, water quality, and water levels
and recently began analyzing the effects of climate change.170 Subsequent
amendments to the Boundary Waters Treaty also empower the IJC to review
lake-wide management plans created by state and federal water quality
agencies.171 In a similarly fragmented fashion, the 1955 Convention on Great
Lakes Fisheries172 established the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission to
166

See, e.g., id. at 16 (noting that uncertainty in models increases as the considered area grows smaller).
See HALL & STUNTZ, supra note 157, at 30–31 (―The scope and standards of the Great Lakes states‘
water management laws vary greatly, resulting in much inconsistency and little certainty in water resource
protection.‖). In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in on numerous water diversions by the State
of Illinois from Lake Michigan. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980).
168 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GREAT LAKES, AN OVERALL STRATEGY AND INDICATORS FOR
MEASURING PROGRESS ARE NEEDED TO BETTER ACHIEVE RESTORATION GOALS 4 (2003); U.S. EPA, Great
Lakes Federal Programs, http://epa.gov/greatlakes/fedprograms.html (last visited May 9, 2009).
169 Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United
States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
170 See MORTSCH ET AL., supra note 157, at 5.
171 Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, U.S.Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 301, superseded in 1978 by 30 U.S.T. 1383, amended in 1983 by 35 U.S.T.
2371, amended in 1987 by Protocol Amending the 1978 Agreement Between the United States of America and
Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, U.S.-Can., Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11551, at Annex II.
172 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries Between the United States of America and Canada, U.S.-Can.,
Sept. 10, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 2836.
167
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coordinate research and control efforts on fisheries—most notably curtailing
the invasive sea lamprey.173
The states and provinces in the Great Lakes Basin have also developed a
series of regional programs focusing on water use, including the Great Lakes
Commission (to gather data and make non-binding recommendations on water
use)174 and a Council of Great Lakes Governors (to coordinate data gathering,
consultation, and the development of a process for regulating new water uses
and diversions).175 As a result, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Water Resources Compact (Compact)176 was adopted in 2008.177 The
Compact prohibits almost any new diversion of water out of the Basin area178
and requires all signatories to apply the same approval standard for new
withdrawals inside the Basin.179 In addition, it establishes a regional inventory
of large water uses180 and requires a review every five years of cumulative
impacts that might consider the effects of climate change.181
Finally, President George W. Bush issued an executive order in 2004,
creating the Great Lakes Interagency Task Force (ITF) in an effort to
coordinate the many federal programs governing the Great Lakes and to lead a
Great Lakes Regional Collaboration (GLRC).182 The GLRC includes the ITF,
the Great Lakes Governors‘ Council, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities

173 See Great Lakes Fisheries Comm‘n, About the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, http://www.glfc.
org/aboutus/brief.php (last visited May 9, 2009).
174 Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414, 415–17 (1968).
175 See COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER: PRINCIPLES FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES (1985); COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, THE
GREAT LAKES CHARTER ANNEX: A SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT TO THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER (2001).
176 COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER
RESOURCES COMPACT (2005) [hereinafter COMPACT], available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/
12-13-05/Great_Lakes-St_Lawrence_River_Basin_Water_Resources_Compact.pdf.
An associated nonbinding agreement incorporates Quebec and Ontario. See COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, GREAT
LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES AGREEMENT (2005), available at
http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/Great_LakesSt_Lawrence_River_Basin_Sustainable_Water
_Resources_Agreement.pdf.
177 See Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342, 122 Stat.
3739 (2008).
178 COMPACT, supra note 176, at § 4.8.
179 Id. at § 4.11.
180 Id. at § 4.1.
181 Id. at § 4.2.
182 Exec. Order No. 13,340, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,043 (May 20, 2004).
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Initiative,183 American Indian tribes, and a task force of members of Congress
from the region. The GLRC‘s chief product to date has been a proposal for
protecting and restoring the Great Lakes.184 The Obama administration
proposed funding to implement much of this strategy,185 which the House of
Representatives approved (and the Senate is considering) as part of the 2010
budget.186
b. Flawed Collaborative Innovations
These various collaborative attempts to reduce the effects of fragmentation
have at best only modestly increased the adaptive capacity of the regulatory
programs that govern and manage the resources in the Great Lakes Basin.
Despite the variety of regional and international entities with a hand in the
Great Lakes, governance is still very fragmented by jurisdiction and by
resource, with few opportunities for regulators and managers to collaborate and
learn from each other and fellow officials. Though the IJC and Great Lakes
Fisheries Commission increased available information and coordination
opportunities for resource managers and regulators for particular Great Lakes
resources, these entities have also created horizontal fragmentation by focusing
on narrow segments of Great Lakes resources. Their influence on Great Lakes
resource management thus has been mixed.187
Similarly, though the regional Compact is an unprecedented step toward
more coordinated and flexible regional water use management, it remains quite
narrow. The Compact largely ignores other resource matters such as water

183 The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative is a binational coalition of local officials for
advancing conservation and restoration in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River. See generally Great Lakes
and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, http://www.glslcities.org/ (last visited May 9, 2009).
184 See GREAT LAKES REG‘L COLLABORATION, GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION STRATEGY TO
RESTORE AND PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES (2005) [hereinafter GLRC STRATEGY].
185 See Great Lakes Restoration Initiative, http://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/glri/ (last visited July 14, 2009).
186 See H.R. 2996, 111th Cong., at 66 (as passed by House, June 26, 2009). The Senate is scheduled to
vote on 2010 funding for this strategy in September 2009. See Stephanie Veale, Schumer Promotes Great
Lakes Initiative, DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE (Rochester, N.Y.), Aug. 25, 2009, available at http://www.
democratandchronicle.com/article/20090825/NEWS01/908250329/1002/NEWS/Schumer-promotes-GreatLakes-initiative
187 See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the
Struggle over the „Hooch‟, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 858 (2005) (―[T]he Commission [has] made
remarkably few regulatory decisions or even recommendations to the two governments given the enormous
development in water use and abuse . . . .‖ (footnote omitted)). See also id. at 858–59 (―The [IJC] . . . has been
less successful in dealing with pollution than in dealing with the more strictly engineering aspects of its
charge.‖ (footnote omitted)).
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quality and biological resources,188 and does little to address water use except
restrict new water exports and uses. As a result, the Compact has been
criticized for failing to fulfill even its declared water use management goals.189
Climate change is likely to make these structural inadequacies worse.190
Perhaps more troubling is the fact that each of the national, regional, and
international attempts to address Great Lakes resource management have failed
to focus on a key consequence of fragmented governance—the limited
capacity for intergovernmental learning. Even though the GLRC represents
the most ambitious attempt to harmonize resource management and restoration
funding efforts, it still suffers from a weak commitment to intergovernmental
learning. The GLRC has made some progress drafting reports on invasive
species, toxic pollution, wetland restoration, and beach contamination.191 It
also ambitiously states that it aspires to coordinate data gathering by the
multitude of agencies with jurisdiction over the Great Lakes,192 which has the
potential to serve as a useful tool for monitoring and adjusting management
strategies (including climate adaptations).
Though perhaps an improvement on previous governance, the GLRC still
does not provide systematic opportunities for cross-jurisdictional information
sharing on essential resource management concerns. The GLRC does propose
the creation of a number of projects designed to generate scientific information
and increase public access to such information.193 The GLRC also fails to
integrate Canadian regulators and consider water management issues, and to
date it has largely ignored climate change as a stressor on Great Lakes
resources. More importantly, though the ambitions of the GLRC for
coordinating scientific data are an improvement on conventional fragmented
188 See COMPACT, supra note 176, at § 4.11 (contemplating only piecemeal consideration of water quality
or biological resources in permit applications for future water withdrawal).
189 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Law‟s Lessons for the Law of the Lakes, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 747, 797 (2007).
190 See id. at 793–94.
191 See GREAT LAKES REG‘L COLLABORATION, AQUATIC INVASIVE SPECIES RAPID RESPONSE INITIATIVE:
PROGRESS REPORT–JUNE 2008 (2008); GREAT LAKES REG‘L COLLABORATION, GLRC TOXIC POLLUTANTS
INITIATIVE: PROGRESS REPORT–NOVEMBER 2008 (2008); GREAT LAKES REG‘L COLLABORATION, GREAT
LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION HABITAT/WETLANDS INITIATIVE: A PROGRESS REPORT AND CALL TO
ACTION (2008); GREAT LAKES REG‘L COLLABORATION, BEACH PROJECT INITIATIVE: PROGRESS REPORT–
NOVEMBER 2008 (2008).
192 See GLRC STRATEGY, supra note 184, at 53–58.
193 See U.S. EPA, 2010 Great Lakes Restoration Initiative Summary of Proposed Programs and Projects
2–6 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/glri/2010GLRIProgramsProjects.pdf (proposing scientific
observing systems, watershed modeling, forest resource analysis, and an information management program for
scientific information as part of the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative).
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governance, the GLRC does not even consider collecting, generating, or
disseminating information evaluating management strategies by participating
agencies that would facilitate intergovernmental learning. Moreover, although
the GLRC stipulates the importance of increased coordination and integration
of monitoring data, it concedes that existing resources for such activities are
wholly insufficient and that, without additional investment, monitoring
activities will decline.194
This limited and erratic commitment to collaboration is representative of
natural resource management in the U.S. and raises serious questions about the
ability of existing governance to address the effects of climate change. The
fact that climate change effects on the Great Lakes have been largely ignored
by this vast array of regulators, including those tasked with reducing the effects
of fragmentation, is telling. Only recently have there been efforts even to
consider integrating the effects of climate change into management
activities.195 Even the IJC—the one institution that has analyzed the possible
effects of climate change on Great Lakes resources under its jurisdiction196—
has yet to even propose adaptation strategies for the Great Lakes Basin. The
absence of an infrastructure for generating and disseminating information to
regulators and managers on regulatory tools and management strategies
represents a failure to harness collectively available information and
experience. This leaves the Great Lakes Basin susceptible to regulatory gaps,
and ultimately reduces prospects for managing the large-scale effects and
considerable uncertainty that is expected to follow from climate change.
Because such experiments fail to provide incentives for regulators and
managers to work with and learn from their counterparts, existing collaborative
efforts have added yet another layer of fragmentation to the already disjointed
regulatory landscape.
B. Natural Resource Governance Is Not Adaptive
In addition to characteristic fragmentation, natural resource governance in
the United States is quite un-adaptive. Existing programs are not designed to

194 See GREAT LAKES REG‘L COLLABORATION, Appendix for the Information and Indicators Strategy
Team, in GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION (2005).
195 The Obama administration‘s proposed Great Lakes Restoration Initiative anticipates convening
Federal agencies ―to coordinate efforts to identify key priorities for climate change impacts
modeling/prediction for Great Lakes ecosystems.‖ U.S. EPA, supra note 193, at 2.
196 See MORTSCH ET AL., supra note 157 (reporting IJC projections on the effects of climate change on
water quality in the Great Lakes region).
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manage uncertainty or reduce the likelihood and magnitude of mistakes that
often result from facing uncertain problems with imprecise tools. Many
natural resource agencies have declared allegiance to changes in management
to make it more adaptive, leading to the creation of various management
experiments. Unfortunately, as exemplified by a prominent regulatory effort
along the Colorado River, such attempts have not been effective at promoting
adaptive decision making due to poor regulatory design and a failure to attend
to resource manager incentives.
1. Existing Governance Impedes Adaptive Adaptation
Traditionally, the legitimacy of natural resource agency decision making—
including promulgating regulations, preparing and implementing management
plans, and permitting or licensing activities—has been fundamentally premised
on agency expertise197 buttressed by interest representation.198 Agencies have
been expected to rely heavily on their presumed expertise at forecasting
detailed, long-range management plans, with public input on proposed
actions—typically a late addendum through a standardized public notice-andcomment process.199 Upon adoption of the plan, agency responsibilities were
presumed to be straightforward—to implement and enforce the plan.200
Yet, this theoretical model of natural resource governance does not match
the reality of substantial uncertainty that agency officials regularly face. With
inevitably limited information regarding natural systems and the effects of
proposed actions, agencies often adopt a plan or course of action that

197 See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 440–
41, 443 (2003) (detailing the ―new deal‖ and ―analytic management‖ models of regulatory management that
trust in agency expertise for legitimacy).
198 See id. at 441–42 (detailing the ―interest representation‖ model of regulatory management that depends
on interest group representation for legitimacy).
199 See Karkkainen III, supra note 154, at 200 (―We are accustomed to thinking of environmental
protection in terms of centralized, top-down prescription of fixed, enforceable, uniform rules. The unstated
background assumption is that an expert regulator . . . will know enough to be able to identify and isolate the
most important problems, and gather sufficient information about them to prescribe effective solutions with
sufficient specificity to translate into legally enforceable commands.‖ (footnote omitted)); Alejandro E.
Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management from the Glen Canyon Dam
Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 954 (2008) [hereinafter Camacho II].
200 See Karkkainen III, supra note 154, at 200 (―This approach assumes . . . that the challenge for the
regulator is to study the problem until she decides she has enough information to prescribe a fixed rule, and
then make it stick.‖ (footnote omitted)).

38

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

subsequent information frequently demonstrates is incomplete or incorrect.201
The dynamic nature of natural systems belies the ability of agencies to rely on
static, long-range planning. As circumstances change, even plans based on
rigorous data can quickly become obsolete.202
Aggravating the problem is the fact that, whether due to a lack of agency
incentives or resources, subsequent monitoring and adjustment of agency
decisions are persistently deficient. Regular monitoring and revision can help
foster agency accountability and legitimacy by pushing regulators to account
for the evolving character of complex systems, particularly when there are
significant uncertainties regarding the initial regulatory decision.203 Though
monitoring of agency decisions is routinely required by statutes and
regulations, and though agencies expressly acknowledge the importance of
accountability,204 agency attention to such directives is notoriously poor.205 As
a result, agencies rarely ensure that their actions are actually achieving
regulatory goals, let alone adjust these decisions when new information is
learned or circumstances change.206
In addition to being inefficient, such an approach leaves natural systems
vulnerable to a host of foreseeable and unforeseeable risks, as agencies are not
aware of whether initial projections were correct, initial strategies were
effective, or new conditions or information have arisen to warrant making
adjustments to such strategies. Equally important, when combined with the
limited public oversight of agency implementation and restricted judicial

201 See id. at 201 (―[W]e inescapably operate under a chronic information deficit with respect to a variety
of factors relevant to environmental decision making. Under the circumstances, the conventional
strategy . . . is a prescription for inaction and ineffectiveness, or policy failure.‖).
202 See, e.g., Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 30 (―If a plan is not updated regularly, or a planning horizon
is too short-sighted in view of climate change, a plan‘s management goals may become outdated or
inappropriate.‖).
203 See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering
Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions; Installment Two, 24 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 269, 296 (2005) [hereinafter Camacho III].
204 See, e.g., Camacho I, supra note 14, at 324–25.
205 See Freeman, supra note 14, at 16–17; Camacho I, supra note 14, at 328; MGMT. SYS. INT‘L, AN
INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE‘S NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM 20 (2008) (―[O]nly 11% of refuge managers surveyed described the current level
of inventory and monitoring work as being mostly or fully sufficient.‖). Cf. E.S. Bernhardt et al., Synthesizing
U.S. River Restoration Efforts, 308 SCI. 636, 637 (2005) (finding only 10% of the 37,099 stream and river
restorations in the United States between 1990 and 2004 that were conducted or authorized by agencies
incorporated any form of monitoring or assessment, and most of those assessments were not designed to share
collected information).
206 Camacho I, supra note 14, at 332–35.
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review,207 the limitations of agency expertise and the absence of true
accountability raise fundamental questions regarding the legitimacy of
resource agency decision making.
In this context, various legal scholars have asserted the importance of
cultivating programs that allow for flexibility and learning in agency
decisions.208 These assertions have paralleled the mounting appeals in the
scientific literature to integrate adaptive management in resource regulation.209
Based on a pragmatic model of decision making as an iterative process of
design, implementation, and evaluation,210 scholars promote refashioning
agency regulation and management through ongoing monitoring and
adaptation.211 Such monitoring and adaptation can promote accountability and
more effective resource management by allowing decisions to be tailored if
conditions change or new information is acquired.212 As I have argued
elsewhere, through systematic ―regulatory learning,‖ agencies can better
manage uncertainty by treating natural resource regulation and management as
long-term processes of provisional decisions followed by monitoring,
evaluation, and adaptation.213
Adaptive management is a particularly useful strategy for managing the
uncertainty of climate change as it increases the ability of a natural system to
absorb and respond to multiple climate change scenarios.214 While operating
in an entirely transparent system where all effects are foreseeable would be
ideal, waiting for the effects of climate change to become completely clear
could result in irreparable losses to ecosystems.215 Adaptive management
strategies have the capacity to incorporate confidence estimates, rather than
strictly black-and-white scenarios.216 Thus, managers can use the imperfect
207

See JAN G. LAITOS, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 34–35 (2002).
See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 14, at 285; Karkkainen II, supra note 147, at 496; Freeman, supra
note 14, at 28–29.
209 See J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 21, 28
n.12 (2005). For an overview of the scientific literature on adaptive management, see notes 114–115 and
accompanying text; GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., USDA, FOREST SERV., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 31–33 (2005).
210 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 14, at 285.
211 See Freeman, supra note 14, at 28.
212 See Camacho III, supra note 203, at 295–97; Freeman, supra note 14, at 28.
213 See Camacho I, supra note 14, at 342–44, 351.
214 Emma L. Tompkins & W. Neil Adger, Does Adaptive Management of Natural Resources Enhance
Resilience to Climate Change?, 9 ECOLOGY & SOC‘Y 1, 1–2 (2004).
215 See, e.g., Scott et al., supra note 96, at 2 (―[D]elaying action could result in irreversible losses to the
integrity, diversity, and health of the [National Wildlife Refuge System].‖).
216 See Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 23–25.
208
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information they possess at any particular time, rather than waiting to act until
the scientific information is clear, knowing that the strategy can be changed as
more information becomes available.217 Adaptive management strategies can
also be used to evaluate basic assumptions of current management plans—for
example, reliance on historic conditions as points of comparison for future
trends.218
Because of these features, many have promoted adaptive
management as the most promising approach for addressing uncertainty in the
face of climate change.219
2. Recent Adaptive Experiments Are also Deficient
Because of the limitations of conventional approaches, many agencies have
declared varying levels of interest in making their regulatory regimes more
adaptive, and some even have experimented with adaptive management.
Regrettably, even some well-regarded attempts at adaptive management have
not sufficiently attended to the design of their experiments or the incentives of
officials and stakeholders to facilitate adaptive regulation.
Numerous federal natural resource agencies have claimed to integrate
adaptive management into decision making. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS) adopted one of the first official statements regarding
adaptive management in 2000; it promulgated guidance requiring adaptive
management strategies under the Endangered Species Act for habitat
conservation plans (HCPs) ―that would otherwise pose a significant risk to the
species due to significant data or information gaps.‖220 It also recently adopted
in principle a ―Strategic Habitat Conservation‖ policy framework,221 which
claims to promote the use of adaptive management for entire landscapes.222 In

217 See Joseph Arvai et al., Adaptive Management of the Global Climate Problem: Bridging the Gap
Between Climate Research and Climate Policy, 78 CLIMATIC CHANGE 217, 219 (2006).
218 See Joyce et al., supra note 83, at 47.
219 See Scott et al., supra note 96, at 37.
220 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. & National Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Addendum to the HCP
Handbook: Questions & Answers, 2 (2000), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/pdfs/HCP/Final_Addendum_
QandA.pdf (last visited July 4, 2009); Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000).
221 See Memorandum from Kenneth Stansell, Acting Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., to Service
Directorate (Mar. 20, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Strategic Habitat Conservation).
222 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Strategic Habitat Conservation: The USFWS Framework for Landscape
Conservation, http://www.fws.gov/science/doc/SHCFactSheet1008pdf.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2009) (―[SHC]
is an adaptive management framework that informs decisions about where and how to expend resources for
wildlife species, or groups of species, in identified priority areas or regions with particular biological
importance—often referred to as landscapes.‖).
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2007, the DOI adopted a technical guide223 and policy guidance seeking
incorporation of adaptive management ―into pertinent internal programmatic
guidance‖ to be considered for use in certain situations.224 Both the DOI and
the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) have proposed incorporating adaptive
management into rules implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act,225 and in 2008, the USFS claimed to promote the use of adaptive
management in its National Forest System Land Management Planning
Rule.226 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has yet to rely on
adaptive management for any major regulatory program,227 and actual use by
any agency is still rare in practice.228
In the few circumstances in which federal agencies have claimed to
implement or regulate adaptive ecosystem management strategies, significant
flaws are apparent. For example, as I have detailed elsewhere, the HCP
program has failed to provide sufficient agency incentives or resources to
implement monitoring and adaptive management effectively.229 Though
monitoring is required in the HCP program, it is usually deficient and even
absent.230 Additionally, regulating agencies only require applicants to use
adaptive management when there are severe data gaps, and even then the

223 BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT:
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE (2007).
224 Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3270, (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://elips.doi.gov/elips/SO_
word/so3270.doc. (―Consideration of [adaptive management] is warranted when: (a) there are consequential
decisions to be made; (b) there is an opportunity to apply learning; (c) the objectives of management are clear;
(d) the value of reducing certainty is high; (e) uncertainty can be expressed as a set of competing, testable
models; and (f) an experimental design and monitoring system can be put in place with a reasonable
expectation of reducing uncertainty.‖).
225 See 36 C.F.R. § 220.5 (2009) (noting in the context of an environmental impact statement that ―[a]n
adaptive management proposal or alternative must clearly identify the adjustment(s) that may be made when
monitoring during project implementation indicates that the action is not having its intended effect, or is
causing unintended and undesirable effects.‖); 43 C.F.R. § 46.145 (2009) (―Bureaus should use adaptive
management, as appropriate, particularly in circumstances where long-term impacts may be uncertain and
future monitoring will be needed to make adjustments in subsequent implementation decisions.‖).
226 36 C.F.R. § 219.3 (2009) (―Land management planning is an adaptive management process that
includes social, economic, and ecological evaluation; plan development, plan amendment, and plan revision;
and monitoring.‖).
227 Carl Bruch, Adaptation Law and the Future of Environmental Law: How Climate Change Will
Reshape Environmental Governance, CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEV. & ECOSYSTEMS COMM. NEWSL.
(Am. Bar Ass‘n, Chicago, Ill.), May 2008, at 13, 15.
228 See, e.g., Camacho I, supra note 14, at 298 (stating that though the FWS has ―repeatedly
acknowledged that adaptive management and contingency planning are valuable characteristics . . . empirical
evidence shows an aversion to implementing them‖).
229 See Camacho I, supra note 14, at 323–35.
230 See id. at 324–28.
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agencies agree that any adaptations in response to unforeseen events must be
funded by the agency.231 Because agency resources for monitoring and
adaptation are paltry, adaptive management is rarely required in HCPs and
subsequent modification of initial strategies is even less common.232 Most
importantly, USFWS does not systematically collect or assess information
about HCPs to allow or direct agency personnel to learn about the relative
value of different negotiating, monitoring, and management strategies.233
Others have detailed similar limitations in other adaptive management
experiments.234 Some have even observed that certain agencies have sought to
use the adaptive management label as a screen for approving action when they
are faced with uncertain effects but have little interest in subsequent
monitoring and adaptation.235 Although leading prototypes of the use of
adaptive management are better than conventional resource governance, as
exemplified by the following case study, they can fall short of the ideal.
3. The Colorado River‟s Flawed Adaptive Management Experiment
Despite a recent high-profile experiment to integrate adaptive management
into governance for a portion of the Colorado River, the current matrix of
regulatory programs still remains remarkably un-adaptive—a problem likely to
be exacerbated by the substantial uncertainty associated with climate change.
Though the river has been popularized as a volatile torrent with the legendary
power to carve out the Grand Canyon, the current flow for ―the most regulated

231

See id. at 329–32.
See id. at 332–35.
233 See id. at 336–42.
234 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and Fall of CALFED, 37
ENVTL. L. 1145 (2007); R. Gregory et al., Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for Applications to
Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2413 (2006) (noting that a program‘s scale,
levels of uncertainty and risk, and lack of institutional support can make applying adaptive management very
difficult); Scott et al., supra note 96, at 29 (―[F]ew resources are available to support post-adoption
implementation, including monitoring, experimentation, and iterative revisions.‖).
235 See Doremus, supra note 16, at 569 (―Promises of adaptive management have become excuses to act
in the face of uncertainty, providing empty assurances of environmental protection without any enforceable
requirements for learning or incorporating new knowledge.‖ (footnote omitted)). Cf. Holly Doremus, Adaptive
Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental
Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 53 (2001) [hereinafter Doremus, Adaptive Management] (―Agencies can
use claims of adaptive management as a ploy to placate demands for environmental protection without actually
imposing any enforceable constraints on themselves.‖).
232
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and over allocated river in the world‖236 is much more labored and controlled.
Numerous dams provide power for thirteen million households237 and water for
more than thirty million people.238 They also support robust recreation
industries,239 but these dams have completely transformed the river.240 In
addition, accelerating consumption241 and drought242 have depleted water
levels. Already, the river often runs dry before reaching the Gulf of
California,243 and even non-climate change projections indicate that live
storage244 in Lakes Mead and Powell will be gone by 2021.245 Unsurprisingly,
controlling and siphoning off water, in concert with other stressors, has taken a
heavy toll on the river‘s ecosystems.246 Today, various native fish, plant, and
bird species are endangered or extirpated in certain river segments,247 and the
once-fertile Colorado River Delta ecosystem has degraded and shrunk eighty
percent in the last century.248

236 N.S. Christensen & D.P. Lettenmaier, A Multimodel Ensemble Approach to Assessment of Climate
Change Impacts on the Hydrology and Water Resources of the Colorado River Basin, 11 HYDROLOGY &
EARTH SYS. SCI. 1417, 1418 (2007).
237 See ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF
IMMENSITY 5 (2007).
238 See id.; MARK T. ANDERSON & LLOYD H. WOOSLEY, JR., WATER AVAILABILITY FOR THE WESTERN
UNITED STATES—KEY SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGES 15 (2005).
239 See ADLER, supra note 237, at 253, 256.
240 See Cristensen & Lettenmaier, supra note 236, at 1418.
241 See ANDERSON & WOOSLEY, supra note 238, at 26, 28 (stating that approximately 300 million gallons
of water per day is consumed in the lower Colorado River Basin beyond the renewable water supply).
242 See id. at 3, 15, 49.
243 See Jennifer J. Follstad Shah et al., River and Riparian Restoration in the Southwest: Results of the
National River Restoration Science Synthesis Project, 15 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 550, 551 (2007)
(interpreting C. Nilsson et al., Fragmentation and Flow Regulation of the World‟s Large River Systems, 308
SCIENCE 405–08 (2005)).
244 Live storage is ―the reservoir space from which water can be evacuated by gravity.‖ See Tim P.
Barnett & David W. Pierce, When Will Lake Mead Go Dry?, 44 WATER RESOURCES RES. W03201 (2008).
245 See id.
246 Dam construction stabilized and lowered water flow and temperature, reduced nutrient content, and
reduced vital sediments, which hindered reproduction and replenishment of beach and sandbar habitat for
certain native species. See ADLER, supra note 237, at 6, 42–45. Introductions of exotic fish and intentional
poisoning of certain native fish by government agencies further altered ecosystems. See id. at 2, 108–09.
247 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., The Upper Colorado River Basin and Endangered Fish,
http://www.fws.gov/coloradoriverrecovery/Crovervu.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (stating four of fourteen
native species of fish are endangered); Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam:
The Elevation of Social Engineering over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896 (2008); Nat‘l Parks Serv., Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area: Plants, http://www.nps.gov/glca/naturescience/plants.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2009) (discussing twenty rare plants and other endemic plant species); ADLER, supra note 237, at 6 (discussing
endangered bird species in the Colorado River Basin).
248 See Barbara J. Morehouse et al., Science and Socio-Ecological Resilience: Examples from the ArizonaSonora Border, 11 ENVTL. SCI. & POL‘Y 272, 276 (2008).
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Climate change is expected to further threaten the Colorado River‘s ability
to serve as a productive resource for the southwestern United States and
northwestern Mexico. The river‘s watershed is particularly susceptible to
climate change because the region is arid, and discharge is highly responsive to
the effects of temperature and precipitation changes on snow accumulation,
melt, and evapotranspiration.249 By mid-century, reservoirs are expected to
hold one-third less water than current levels, and hydropower generation could
decrease by nearly forty percent.250 Recent studies also indicate that the area
will become drier, woodland vegetation will be replaced (if at all) by desert
species, and wildfires will be more intense and frequent.251 Few projections of
localized effects exist,252 and there is considerable variability in these
projections.253 Yet even under conservative temperature predictions and a nopopulation-growth scenario, the Colorado River will be unable to maintain
existing water allocations.254 Because almost all of the river‘s water is
consumed, any reduction would be highly disruptive to the ecosystem and
water allocation demands.255 As stated by one recent study, ―the fully
allocated Colorado system [is] at the brink of failure, wherein virtually any
reduction in precipitation over the Basin, either natural or anthropogenic, will
lead to the failure of mandated allocations.‖256

249

See Christensen & Lettenmaier, supra note 236, at 1418.
See Tim Barnett et al., The Effects of Climate Change on Water Resources in the West: Introduction
and Overview, 62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 6, 7 (2004). Another leading study projects that discharge at the
river‘s rough midpoint may decrease by twenty percent by mid-century. See P.C.D. Milly et al., Letters,
Global Pattern of Trends in Streamflow and Water Availability in a Changing Climate, 438 NATURE 347
(2005).
251 See Nat‘l Parks Serv., Grand Canyon Nat‘l Park, Research on Wildfire Hazard Reduction in
Ponderosa Pine Ecosystems at Grand Canyon National Park: Executive Summary, http://www.nps.gov/
archive/grca/forest/execsum.htm (last visited July 5, 2009).
252 In fact, many recent agency analyses do not even consider the local effects of climate change. See
Nat‘l Parks Serv., Grand Canyon Nat‘l Park, Science Research—Current Projects, http://www.nps.gov/
grca/naturescience/research_current_projects.htm (last visited July 5, 2009); Nat‘l Parks Serv., Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area, Research at Glen Canyon (2008), http://www.nps.gov/glca/naturescience/upload/
CURRENT%20RESEARCH%20AT%20GLEN%20CANYON%20NATIONAL%20RECREATION%20ARE
A.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
253 See, e.g., Christensen & Lettenmaier, supra note 236, at 1428 (―While all models agree with respect to
the direction of temperature changes, there is considerable variability in the magnitude, direction, and
seasonality of projected precipitation changes.‖).
254 See Barnett et al., supra note 250, at 6.
255 See Christensen & Lettenmaier, supra note 236, at 1419.
256 Barnett et al., supra note 250, at 7.
250
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a. From Conflicting Mandates to an Attempt at Adaptive Management
Colorado River governance incorporates a well-known regulatory
innovation purporting to promote adaptive and collaborative decision making.
However, this experiment has only added a modest level of adaptability to the
river‘s arcane regulatory machinery. Allocation of the river‘s water is
governed by the ―Law of the River,‖ a motley assemblage of statutes, court
decisions, treaties, contracts, decrees, and regulatory guidelines257 that has
been the subject of political debate and litigation for decades.258 The Basin is
also subject to a suite of federal and state environmental and natural resource
laws,259 including the Endangered Species Act, which was activated by the
listing of four endangered fish that inhabit the river.260 The resulting
protections for these species and their ecosystems have produced persistent
conflict with the water-allocation and secondary hydropower-generation goals
advanced by the Law of the River.261 Limited scientific knowledge of these
sensitive resources and uncertainty about the effects of dam operations have
exacerbated this tension.262
Nowhere is this resource conflict between consumptive, power generation,
ecological, and recreational uses more prominent than in the operation of Glen
Canyon Dam and its effects on the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area and
Grand Canyon National Park. Ostensibly to resolve this tension, Congress

257 The Law of the River most notably includes the following: Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43
U.S.C. § 620 (2008) (enacted 1956); Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1556 (2008)
(enacted 1968); Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949); Treaty Respecting
Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59
Stat. 1219; Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006) (consolidated Supreme Court decree incorporating
Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), and subsequent amendments). For a complete list of the Law of
the River, see U.S. Dep‘t of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colo. Region, The Law of the River,
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html (last visited July 5, 2009).
258 See ADLER, supra note 237, at 19, 141–54 (detailing recurring interstate litigation and conflict between
environmental, hydropower, agriculture, and recreation interests).
259 See Camacho II, supra note 199, at 946.
260 Native Fish and Wildlife: Endangered Species, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967); Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Critical Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes:
Razorback Sucker, Colorado Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail Chub, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374 (Mar. 21,
1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
261 See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. CV-07-8164-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL
1458784, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 26, 2009) (holding that FWS opinion on Colorado River dam project violated
ESA, Bureau of Reclamation experimental plan did not violate Grand Canyon Protection Act, and
environmental assessment for dam project did consider appropriate and reasonable alternatives under NEPA);
see also Camacho II, supra note 199, at 947.
262 See Camacho II, supra note 199, at 948.
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passed the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 (GCPA),263 but in fact,
Congress merely evaded responsibility by tasking the Secretary of the Interior
to design a process for reconciling the conflicting legal mandates.264 Pursuant
to congressional authority provided in the GCPA,265 in 1997 the Secretary of
the Interior established the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program
(AMP) as an experimental effort at collaborative adaptive management
involving various federal agencies, the Colorado River Basin states,266
American Indian tribes, academics, environmental organizations, the recreation
industry, and power users.267 The AMP notably includes: (1) the Grand
Canyon Monitoring and Research Center (GCMRC), a scientific research
program proposed as one of the first government institutions to rely on
adaptive management for long-term monitoring and research; (2) the Adaptive
Management Working Group (AMWG), a twenty-five member federal
advisory committee intended to improve regulatory decision making by
engaging a range of affected stakeholders in management decisions; (3) a
Technical Work Group tasked with liaising between the AMWG and GCMRC;
and (4) an independent science advisory committee. 268
The AMP is often identified by agencies and observers as one of the most
successful examples of adaptive management in regulatory decision making.269
To be sure, the AMP has a number of promising elements. The GCMRC
integrates a well-funded information gathering and assessment apparatus
charged with scientific monitoring and research and relies on robust
independent peer review panels ―to assess the quality of research, monitoring,
or science being conducted.‖270 Admirers of the AMP identify a number of
high-profile experimental flood releases from Glen Canyon Dam that have

263

Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4669 (1992).
See Camacho II, supra note 199, at 948.
265 Grand Canyon Protection Act, supra note 263, at §§ 1803(b), 1804(c)(3), 1805(a), (c).
266 These include Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. See
Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. III(d), 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
267 See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DEP‘T OF THE INTERIOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: GLEN CANYON DAM
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT. PROGRAM 4, 9 (2001), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_final.
pdf.
268 See id. at 2–3; Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Purpose and Goals, http://www.
gcdamp.gov/aboutamp/pg.html (last visited July 13, 2009).
269 See, e.g., Secretary of the Interior, supra note 224 (stating adaptive management ―has proved to be a
useful approach in cases such as the Bureau of Reclamation‘s management of Glen Canyon Dam‖);
Dirk Kempthorne, Message from the Secretary, in WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 223, at i; see also Camacho II,
supra note 199, at 956–57.
270 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 267, at 6.
264
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provided valuable scientific information about the downstream ecosystem.271
Such management experimentation, monitoring, and assessment are vital steps
in any attempt to cope with uncertainty in resource management and are indeed
a considerable improvement on conventional resource governance.
b. The Flaws of an Acclaimed Experiment
Yet, despite these enhancements, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP (Glen
Canyon AMP) exemplifies the unfulfilled promise of recent experiments
seeking to increase government capacity to manage uncertainty adaptively.
The AMP is plagued by a weak and uncertain mandate and provides
insufficient incentives for collaborative and adaptive decision making. This is
in part because there is substantial uncertainty regarding what the function of
the AMP—and the AMWG in particular—should be in managing the
conflicting mandates of the GCPA.272 The relationship of the AMWG to any
decisions made regarding Glen Canyon Dam management by the Secretary of
Interior is very unclear, as the Secretary is free to disregard AMWG
recommendations without explanation. Without a clear and direct role in
resource management decisions, the AMP acts as nothing more than a costly
―accessory to the regulatory process.‖273
Furthermore, the AMP lacks any standards for assessing and ensuring the
program‘s progress toward regulatory goals.274 As a result, though important
scientific information has been gained through GCMRC experiments, the AMP
provides no concrete thresholds delineating when any such data must be used
to adjust management of the dam.275 Although the GCMRC engages in
experiments, monitoring, and assessment of the results, it has no standard or
deadline for making adjustments to operations to account for new information
obtained through such experiments. It is telling that over the twelve years of
the AMP‘s existence, not a single modification to long-term operations of the
dam has been made,276 and the AMP has failed to reliably improve the quality

271 See, e.g., Doremus, Adaptive Management, supra note 235, at 78–79; Vicky J. Meretsky et al.,
Balancing Endangered Species and Ecosystems: A Case Study of Adaptive Management in Grand Canyon, 25
ENVTL. MGMT. 579 (2000).
272 See Camacho II, supra note 199, at 949–50.
273 See id. at 951.
274 See id. at 957.
275 See id.
276 See id.
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of the fragile downstream ecosystem.277 Though perhaps interesting as
academic exercises, the AMP‘s research experiments are not adaptive
management because they have never been used to adapt resource management
decisions.
Most problematic, however, is the lost opportunity to gather information
about adopted management strategies and the Glen Canyon AMP itself.278 The
GCMRC does gather considerable scientific data about the natural systems and
resources in the AMP area. But, like virtually every other natural resource
program, nobody in the AMP is required to gather, analyze, or distribute any
information on the efficacy of adopted resource management strategies or
decision-making processes. Without clear requirements or incentives to
monitor and adjust the AMP, the AMP‘s managers simply do not consider in
any systematic way whether adopted management strategies or the AMP have
been effective at achieving the program‘s goals. Because systematic
monitoring and adjustment of management strategies is not required, Congress,
the Secretary of the Interior, and the AMWG have little capacity to adapt the
AMP or its management strategies to make them more effective.279
In short, like all other natural resource programs, the AMP has not
developed an infrastructure for reducing uncertainty or improving the efficacy
of management strategies currently in use. The lack of systematic information
on the past performance of such strategies compounds the uncertainty that
agencies confront in managing the natural systems under their jurisdiction—
uncertainty, of course, that is magnified with the ascendancy of climate
change. As a result, programs such as the AMP are sandwiched between
management uncertainties and uncertainties about natural systems, with little
incentive to reduce either.280 A key lesson from management efforts like the
Glen Canyon AMP, then, is that even programs adopted to adaptively manage
natural resources need a comprehensive framework for managing not only
uncertainty about changing natural systems but also information gaps
regarding the efficacy of their resource management strategies and resource
programs.

277 See Memorandum from Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. to Deputy Reg‘l Dir., Bureau of
Reclamation, Upper Colo. Region, Salt Lake City, Utah (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/
envdocs/bo/FinalGCDBO2-26-08.pdf.
278 See Camacho II, supra note 199, at 955–56.
279 See id. at 957.
280 Indeed, like most other natural resource programs, the AMP has not publicly considered or adopted
any strategies to account for, or respond to, the acute climate effects projected for the Colorado River Basin.
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C. Lessons for Managing Uncertainty: A Learning Infrastructure
The various regulatory experiments introduced to promote collaborative
and adaptive management provide valuable lessons for building the capacity of
natural resource governance to manage uncertainty associated with climate
change. Unfortunately, as exemplified by Great Lakes governance, attempts to
reduce the effects of fragmentation have provided at best weak opportunities
and incentives for cross-jurisdictional information sharing and collaboration.
Furthermore, as illustrated by the Glen Canyon AMP, even adaptive
management innovations have not been structured to require or otherwise
promote adaptive decision making. As a result, despite these experimental
efforts, most natural resource programs still lack the tools and incentives to
learn systematically from their own management experience. They also
remain isolated and unable to harness the broader knowledge of other natural
resource managers.
In essence, these experiments demonstrate that natural resource governance
has failed to develop the systemic capacity to manage uncertainty. What is
needed is an infrastructure that proliferates opportunities for information
sharing and that cultivates learning. As further detailed in Part V, such an
infrastructure should include the development of a shared, easily accessible
clearinghouse for the collection and dissemination of scientific data and
evaluations of management decisions among government programs.281 Such
an effort would serve to reduce the negative consequences of regulatory
fragmentation by harnessing the collective experience of natural resource
agencies and facilitating collaborative learning among jurisdictions.
In addition, such a learning infrastructure should emphasize adaptive
governance—regular monitoring, assessment, and adjustment of all agency
decision making as judged against stated statutory goals.282 Adaptive
governance seeks to go beyond adaptive management, which focuses on
assessing and adjusting individual agency regulatory or management choices
for particular resource problems. Adaptive governance is the systematic
evaluation and adaptation of all agency decisions (including rulemaking and
planning activities) in furtherance of stated program goals. It even includes the
assessment of agency personnel and of the agencies themselves against
statutory goals. The development of such an adaptive infrastructure that
induces agencies and stakeholders to learn throughout the governance process
281
282

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
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is vital for managing and reducing the uncertainty accompanying climate
change.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING CLIMATE ADAPTATIONS
Global climate change has accelerated the necessity of developing
systematic adaptive regulation and inter-jurisdictional information sharing.
Given the substantial shortcomings of existing governance—and the pressing
need to address the effects of climate change—a vital path for addressing the
additional stress from climate change is clear. Legislators and agencies must
adopt, fund, and encourage comprehensive procedural adaptation strategies
that cultivate the development of monitoring, information gathering, and
adaptation protocols in natural resource governance. Information generation,
collection, and dissemination must be coordinated among jurisdictions in order
to diminish the negative effects of regulatory fragmentation that discourage
adaptation and learning by regulators and managers..
Unfortunately, effective implementation of adaptation measures is often
neglected by decision-makers.
Agencies have focused primarily on
substantive adaptations, neglecting the need to change natural resource
governance to manage the uncertainty of climate change. It is encouraging that
a few programs propose to foster information sharing and adaptive
management in resource management. However, even these programs and the
agencies involved ignore the need to adopt procedural adaptations that promote
agency learning about the regulatory process itself. By doing so, agencies are
repeating mistakes in addressing uncertainty from recent regulatory
experiments, with potentially crippling effects for natural systems in the face
of climate change.
A. Few Adopt or Propose Adaptive or Collaborative Adaptations
As detailed earlier, as a paradigmatic regulatory commons, few regulators
have adopted any strategies for adapting to climate change.283 Managers
continue to rely on strategies premised on historically normal conditions that
even agency officials concede are not likely to apply under projected climate
change scenarios.284 As of August 2009, Congress has not adopted any
283

See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 142, at 8, 37 (describing how a lack of new guidance from agency
officials impairs managers‘ ability to address climate change issues). See also IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note
284
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strategies expressly directed at climate change adaptation, and few federal bills
even proposing adaptation have focused on adaptive management and
interagency information sharing.285
Similarly, despite growing calls for the use of adaptive management,286 the
few agencies considering adaptation neglect adaptive and collaborative
procedural strategies. Department of Interior agencies have developed
remarkably few adaptation strategies despite a 2001 order from the Secretary
requiring programs to account for climate change in all long-range planning
and major management decisions.287 Virtually all National Park management
plans ignore climate change or reject consideration of any proactive
adaptation.288 Even the certified ―Climate Friendly‖ National Parks289

23, at 637 (―In general, decision makers lack the tools and perspectives to integrate future climate, particularly
events that exceed historic norms.‖ (citation omitted)).
285 See, e.g., Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. §§ 4701–02, 4801,
7005 (2008) (proposing adaptation fund, review of national adaptation needs and costs, international climate
change adaptation program, and periodic update of adaptation strategies); Coastal State Climate Change
Planning Act of 2008, H.R. 5453, 110th Cong. (2008) (seeking funding of state coastal adaptation planning);
Climate Change Drinking Water Adaptation Research Act, S. 2970, 110th Cong. (2008) (seeking drinking
water adaptation study); Climate Change Adaptation Act, S. 2355, 110th Cong. (as reported with amendments
and an amendment to the title, June 5, 2008) (requiring the President to create a national adaptation plan and
directing the Secretary of Commerce to oversee regional vulnerability assessments and plans).
One exception is the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives and placed on calendar in the U.S. Senate. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, June 26, 2009, placed on Senate Legislative Calendar,
July 7, 2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&
docid=f:h2454eh.txt.pdf (proposing, among other things, the creation of a National Climate Service, at § 452,
as ―a collaborative, interagency research and operational program . . . for reliable, timely, and relevant
information related to climate variability and change,‖ as well as a Natural Resources Adaptation Science and
Information program in the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), at § 477, ―for developing and providing science
and information needed to assess and address the impacts of climate change and ocean acidification on natural
resources‖). See also Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, S. 22, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing
information exchange in conjunction with strategic plan for research on ocean acidification adaptation).
286 See, e.g., NAT‘L WILDLIFE FED‘N, A LETTER FROM SCIENTISTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
URGING ACTION TO ADDRESS THE THREATS OF GLOBAL WARMING TO WILDLIFE AND ECOSYSTEMS (2008);
WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, supra note 56, at 2.
287 See Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3226, Amendment No. 1 (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://
www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wy/programs/science.Par.46189.File.dat/SO_3226A1.pdf
(replacing
Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3226 (Jan. 19, 2001)).
288 See, e.g., NAT‘L PARKS SERV., SAGUARO NATIONAL PARK: ABBREVIATED FINAL GENERAL
MANAGEMENT PLAN/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3 (2008), available at http://planning.nps.gov/
document/SAGU%20Abbrev_WEB_part1.pdf (―Because the issue of global climate change is an emerging
scientific field, the General Management Plan did not address this topic specifically. As part of NPS
inventorying and monitoring efforts the park staff will establish a program to track associated effects on park
resources as a result of climate change. If and when effects are identified through this program, the park staff
would then recommend necessary changes in management policies . . . .‖).
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typically fail to mention adaptation in their ―Climate Friendly Parks Action
Plans,‖ focusing only on mitigation of the climate footprint of any particular
park.290
The USFWS response to climate change is primarily limited to researching
its effects and considering how to incorporate these findings into future
management.291 One minor exception is the Habitat Conservation program,
which USFWS claims is attempting to accelerate coordination and
collaboration with other agencies and private parties to conserve habitat due to
climate change.292 In addition, though not yet an adopted adaptation strategy,
encouragingly in September 2009 the USFWS produced a draft plan for public
comment that proposes the development over the next five years of a national
adaptation strategy for fish and wildlife that would employ ―Strategic Habitat
Conservation,‖293 which if adopted would help promote the use of adaptive
management and inter-agency collaboration.294 Other Interior agencies like the
Bureau of Land Management have not adopted any adaptations.295
It is encouraging that USFS published a strategic adaptation plan in
October 2008 that briefly mentions the need for better data management,
collaboration, and agency learning.296 However, virtually the entire plan is
289 Nat‘l Parks Serv., Climate Friendly Parks, http://www.nps.gov/climatefriendlyparks/ (last visited Feb.
18, 2009) (―The Climate Friendly Parks program is a joint partnership between the [EPA] and the [NPS].
Climate Friendly Parks from around the country are leading the way in the effort to protect our parks‘ natural
and cultural resources and ensure their preservation for future generations.‖).
290 See, e.g., NAT‘L PARKS SERV. ENVTL. LEADERSHIP PROGRAM, CLIMATE FRIENDLY PARKS: YOSEMITE
NATIONAL PARK ACTION PLAN (2006). Two parks do refer to adaptive management in their ―Climate Friendly
Parks Action Plans,‖ albeit only in passing. See NAT‘L PARKS SERV. ENVTL. LEADERSHIP PROGRAM, CLIMATE
FRIENDLY PARKS: HAWAII VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARK BECOMES A CLIMATE FRIENDLY PARK 7 (2007);
NAT‘L PARKS SERV. ENVTL. LEADERSHIP PROGRAM, CLIMATE FRIENDLY PARKS: ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NATIONAL PARK ACTION PLAN 8 (2007).
291 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Climate Change: What We‘re Doing, http://www.fws.gov/home/
climatechange/ouractions.html (last visited July 14, 2009) (describing several research programs).
292 See id.
293 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
294 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESPONDING TO
ACCELERATING CLIMATE CHANGE 10, 18-20 (2009) (public comment draft).
295 Personal communication with E. Dwight Fielder, Bureau of Land Management, Division Chief, Fish,
Wildlife and Plant Conservation (Aug. 1, 2008) (noting that BLM has not adopted any official climate
adaptations).
296 See U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONDING TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 7 (2008) (mentioning the ―need to work collaboratively‖ with federal, state, tribal, and local
authorities); id. at 8 (discussing the need for ―improved, coordinated, and enhanced monitoring systems,
predictive models, decision support tools, and databases‖); id. at 11 (―Addressing climate change will depend
on reducing institutional barriers and increasing adaptive learning through experimentation.‖). As provided for
in this strategy, USFS did recently create guidance documents on incorporating climate change into NEPA
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dedicated to substantive responses,297 as are all existing USFS adaptation
strategies.298 Furthermore, only 15 of 121 USFS forest plans even reference
climate change as a risk factor.299
Other federal agencies ignore the need for adaptive regulation but have
advocated limited steps toward better interagency cooperation. With one
important exception,300 EPA‘s planned adaptation strategy is limited to a
recently published ―National Water Program Strategy‖ that concentrates on
mitigation and specific, un-adaptive adaptations.301
Its discussion of
adaptation chiefly focuses on substantive strategies that adjust existing water
programs to account for the direct effects of climate change.302 However, the
Water Program Strategy does describe a watershed-based ―coordinating
framework‖ that contemplates some interagency cooperation.303 Similarly,
though ignoring adaptive management, NOAA has begun coordinating the
collection of certain scientific data with Canadian agencies304 and has
suggested a National Climate Service to coordinate climate information and
services across the federal government.305
Generally, state governments have not fared any better at developing
adaptation strategies that promote adaptive decision making or information
sharing. Only a small minority of states even considered adaptation in their
Climate Action Plans (CAPs), and even a smaller number discuss it with any
specificity, or are preparing plans that will detail proposed adaptation
efforts.306 The few state CAPs to discuss adaptation primarily focus on
planning that briefly mention adaptive management. See U.S. FOREST SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE
CONSIDERATIONS IN PROJECT LEVEL NEPA ANALYSIS (2009), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nepa/
climate_change/includes/cc_nepa_guidance.pdf; U.S. FOREST SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE CONSIDERATIONS IN
LAND MANAGEMENT PLAN REVISIONS (2009), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nepa/climate_change/
includes/cc_land_mgmt_plan_rev.pdf.
297 See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONDING TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 9 (2008) (noting thinning of forest stands and prescribed fire).
298 See, e.g., Joyce et al., supra note 83, at 21.
299 Id. at 45.
300 See also infra Part IV.B.1 (evaluating EPA‘s Climate Ready Estuaries pilot program).
301 U.S. EPA, supra note 106, at 61.
302 See id. at iv.
303 See id. at 40.
304 News Release, Nat‘l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., United States, Canada Begin New Climate
Data-Sharing Agreement (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2008/20081114_
canadaclimate.html.
305 See NAT‘L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TOWARDS A NATIONAL CLIMATE SERVICE (2008),
available at http://www.dco.noaa.gov/transition/corporatestrategy/climate_service_2pg.pdf.
306 See U.S. EPA, State Climate Action Plans Database, http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/StatePolicyActions.
nsf/webpages/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (compiling state Climate Action Plans). Montana
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substantive strategies307 or only quickly mention the value of adaptive
management308 or coordinating information,309 without providing the necessary
detail about how this should and could be accomplished effectively. Similarly,
many state ―Wildlife Action Plans‖310 fail to even mention climate change, and
those that do so fail to discuss adaptation or do so only briefly.311 Because
federal and state governments have neglected adaptation activities, those local
governments interested in developing adaptation strategies lack vital localized
scientific data and funding necessary to prepare for the effects of climate
change.312
B. The Limitations of the Few Promising Adaptation Strategies
In a positive development, two government programs have been created
that endorse adaptive management and agency collaboration in the context of
climate change adaptation. Though the U.S. Climate Change Science Program
and EPA‘s Climate Ready Estuaries program are certainly improvements on

specifically rejected adaptation, regarding it as a low priority. GOVERNOR‘S CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY
COMM., MONTANA CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 7-3 (2007).
307 See, e.g., ARIZ. CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY GROUP, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 43 (2006)
(―recommend[ing] that a comprehensive state climate change adaptation strategy be developed and
implemented‖).
308 See, e.g., WASH. CLIMATE ADVISORY TEAM, 2008 CLIMATE CHANGE INTERIM REPORT: LEADING THE
WAY ON CLIMATE CHANGE; THE CHALLENGE OF OUR TIME 154 (2008) (―Laws, regulations and decisionmaking systems may need to . . . accept risk for the sake of learning and adaptive management.‖);
GOVERNOR‘S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GROUP, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ADDRESSING RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE 22 (2008) (urging Oregon state authorities to ―[u]se and continually
improve adaptive management processes and contingency planning‖).
309 See GOVERNOR‘S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GROUP, supra note 308, at 22 (recommending
Oregon ―[c]oordinate research agendas across states and regions‖); GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, FINAL REPORT: A CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 33–38 (2008) (recommending collaboration on
regional adaptations); GOVERNOR‘S ACTION TEAM ON ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, FLORIDA‘S ENERGY AND
CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 8-5 (2008) (recommending coordination with federal agencies, other states,
and countries). Maryland‘s CAP mentions the need for ―intergovernmental coordination on coastal
adaptation,‖ but leaves it for the federal government to create. See Md. Comm‘n on Climate Change, Building
a Federal-State Partnership, in MARYLAND CLIMATE ACTION PLAN ch. 6, at 10 (2008).
310 A Wildlife Action Plan assessing the condition of a state‘s wildlife and outlining necessary
conservation actions is required of any state seeking funds through the federal State Wildlife Grants Program
or Wildlife Conservation and Restoration Program. Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 669c(d)(1)(D) (2008).
311 See, e.g., JEFF LERNER ET AL., DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, CONSERVATION ACROSS THE LANDSCAPE: A
REVIEW OF THE STATE WILDLIFE ACTION PLANS 13 (2006).
312 See Ashley Lowe et al., Ctr. for Clean Air Policy, Ask the Climate Question: Adapting to Climate
Change Impacts in Urban Regions 4–6 (2009), available at http://www.ccap.org/docs/resources/674/Urban_
Climate_Adaptation-FINAL_CCAP%206-9-09.pdf (stating local governments need more funding and more
localized climate data to engage in adaptation activities).
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conventional natural resource governance, the former has no regulatory
authority, and the latter is small with little funding. More fundamentally,
neither program seeks to set up a systematic infrastructure for developing and
sharing information on the past and future performance of potential strategies
for managing natural resources.313
1. The Climate Ready Estuaries Program and Charlotte Harbor Estuary
The EPA‘s recently created Climate Ready Estuaries pilot program
promises to supplement the agency‘s existing regional collaboration program
for estuaries, the National Estuaries Program, by providing additional federal
information gathering and coordination. This rare and promising program has
elements that could promote valuable information sharing and adaptive
decision making. Unfortunately, it also seems poised to repeat the mistakes
made by recent innovations in adaptive and collaborative governance.
a. The National Estuaries Program and Charlotte Harbor Estuary
Though estuaries314 are managed by numerous government programs315
under various statutes,316 the EPA‘s National Estuaries Program (NEP)317 is a
core estuary protection program that fundamentally relies on
intergovernmental collaboration. The NEP includes twenty-eight estuaries,
313

Similarly, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has initiated a National Climate Change and Wildlife
Science Center, which funds limited scientific research and has identified priority research needs, including
data assessment and model interpretation, downscaling, decision-support tools, and the ―[d]evelopment of
clearinghouse and network capacity for standardized data and synthesis sharing.‖ USGS, National Climate
Change and Wildlife Science Center, http://nccw.usgs.gov/ (last visited May 8, 2009). Though in early
development, like the Climate Ready Estuaries program, this Center does not appear to contemplate
developing and incorporating systematic information on the performance of management strategies and
agencies.
314 Estuaries are ―semi-enclosed bod[ies] of water on the seacoast in which fresh and salt water mix,‖ thus
serving as rich sources of biological productivity and ecosystem services. Peterson et al., supra note 96, at 4
(citation omitted).
315 These include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration‘s National Estuarine Research
Reserve System and its Restoration Center, EPA‘s National Estuary Program, and state and local governments.
See NOAA, Estuaries & You, http://www.estuaries.gov/estuaries101/About/Default.aspx?ID=251 (last visited
May 5, 2009) (providing a list of governmental programs that protect and study estuaries).
316 These include the Coastal Zone Management Act, the Estuary Restoration Act, the Endangered
Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act. See Peterson et al., supra note 96, at 12–17 (discussing statutes that serve to protect
estuaries).
317 The NEP was established in 1987 under the Clean Water Act § 320 and was amended by the Estuaries
and Clean Waters Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994); Estuaries and Clean Waters Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2903
(2000).
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each of which has completed a Comprehensive Conservation and Management
Plan (CCMP).318 While focusing on water quality, each CCMP seeks to
coordinate management of a variety of estuarine resources.319 Like many
collaborative innovations, NEP estuaries lack direct regulatory authority,
relying on coordination, voluntary commitments, and providing incentives to
regulators with jurisdiction.320
The Charlotte Harbor National Estuary Program (Charlotte Harbor),
encompassing 4,700 square miles in western Florida, exemplifies the promise
of NEP estuaries. Charlotte Harbor was named an ―estuary of national
significance‖ and included in the NEP in 1995.321 Incredibly, Charlotte Harbor
seeks to integrate eight federal agencies, twenty-six state agency divisions,
seven counties, twenty-four cities, two water management districts, three
regional planning councils, and at least eighty other special districts.322
Despite this fragmentation, Charlotte Harbor developed its original CCMP
through a collaborative ―management conference‖ composed of government
authorities, academics, stakeholders, and interested citizens, with EPA
approving the CCMP in 2001.323
Like the Glen Canyon AMP, some have lauded the NEP as a successful
experiment in collaborative ecosystem-based management.324 Relying on
318 See U.S. EPA, Nat‘l Estuary Program, Comprehensive Conservation and Management Plans,
http://www.epa.gov/nep/ccmp/index.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).
319 See Peterson et al., supra note 96, at 1 (stating the CCMPs have management goals of maintaining
water quality, sustaining fish and wildlife populations, preserving habitats, protecting human values, and
fulfilling water quality needs).
320 Id. at 7. However, once approved, any federal action must be consistent with the CCMP. See Hope
M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered Federalism: Can Cooperative
Federalism Models from Other Laws Save Our Public Lands?, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y
449, 473 (2008) (―Once approved, any federal action must be consistent with the plan.‖ (footnote omitted)).
321 CHARLOTTE HARBOR NAT‘L ESTUARY PROGRAM, COMMITTING TO OUR FUTURE, A COMPREHENSIVE
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE GREATER CHARLOTTE HARBOR WATERSHED FROM VENICE
TO BONITA SPRINGS TO WINTER HAVEN 2 (2008) [hereinafter CHARLOTTE CCMP].
322 Id. at 11–12.
323 See Charlotte Harbor Nat‘l Estuary Program, Who‘s Who in the Charlotte Harbor National Estuary
Program Management Conference, http://www.chnep.org/NEP/committees/MgtConf.htm#Legislative%
20Subcommittee (last visited May 5, 2009) (describing policy, management, technical advisory, and citizen
advisory committees).
324 See Richard H. Pierce et al., Charlotte Harbor Initiative: Assessing the Ecological Health of Southwest
Florida‟s Charlotte Harbor Estuary, 13 ECOTOXICOLOGY 275, 276 (2004) (―Rarely do opportunities arise that
facilitate the creation of scientific ventures with a broadly interdisciplinary approach. Where such
opportunities have existed in the past (e.g., the National Estuary Program), the insights and benefits have been
remarkable.‖); U.S. EPA, National Estuary Program, Implementing a Community-Based Watershed Approach,
http://www.epa.gov/neplessons/ (last visited May 5, 2009) (detailing the ―Keys to Success‖ of NEPs); see
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collaborative decision making to develop management efforts,325 the NEP
serves as a facilitator and capacity builder that helps provide the momentum
for overcoming the incentives to under-regulate that are created by regulatory
fragmentation.326 NEP estuaries are relatively well-funded,327 and some are
making progress toward their stated goals.328
Evidence suggests, however, that the NEP may be more of a qualified
achievement. For at least some estuaries, once the CCMP is approved, the
collaborative ―management conference‖ has no function, leaving plan
implementation to voluntary compliance by each government entity.329
Moreover, the NEP‘s manual for community-based watershed management
never mentions adaptive management or seeks to implement procedures for
systematic plan adjustment.330 Unsurprisingly, the NEP also does not create
any program-wide method for estuaries and their constituent agencies to
systematically share information or otherwise learn from the experiences of
other estuaries.
Even if the NEP could be deemed a partial success to date, climate change
is likely to cripple estuarine resources and management. Most NEP estuaries
remain substantially impaired by invasive species, fishing, pollution,
waterfront construction, and habitat degradation.331 Yet estuaries are likely to
experience some of the most severe effects of climate change, including
changing temperature, rising sea levels, changing precipitation that affects
generally Mark Lubell, Resolving Conflict and Building Cooperation in the National Estuary Program, 33
ENVTL. MGMT. 677 (2004) (―[T]he NEP does a better job of resolving conflict and building project-level
cooperation than similar estuaries without the NEP.‖).
325 See COASTAL MGMT. BRANCH, U.S. EPA, COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT: LESSONS
FROM THE NATIONAL ESTUARY PROGRAM 4–5 (2005) [hereinafter U.S. EPA, LESSONS] (―By ensuring that
stakeholders responsible for and interested in the management and use of the estuary are involved in the
process, the NEPs have achieved successful collaboration.‖).
326 See Babcock, supra note 320, at 473 (describing the facilitator role of the federal government under
the ―collaborative management‖ model).
327 See U.S. EPA, Nat‘l Estuary Program, Sustainable Financing Strategies, http://www.epa.gov/nep/fund.
html (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).
328 For example, Charlotte Harbor claimed that by 2006, ―progress ha[d] been made on all of the original
15 quantifiable objectives, with 2 of the 15 (13%) objectives and 13 of the 48 (27%) original priority actions
having been accomplished.‖ CHARLOTTE CCMP, supra note 321, at 2.
329 See Babcock, supra note 320, at 474 (―The management conference has no continuing function once
the plan is approved.‖). But see CHARLOTTE CCMP, supra note 321, at 7–10 (discussing subsequent activities
of management conference subcommittees).
330 See U.S. EPA, LESSONS, supra note 325, at 43–44, 62–63 (discussing only conventional monitoring
options).
331 See Peterson et al., supra note 96, at 8–9 (outlining various environmental stressors on biological
communities).
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runoff, and altered wind and storm patterns.332 Collateral effects of human
adaptations to protect private property (such as shoreline armoring) are likely
to further impair estuarine resources in unknown ways.333 In fact, the U.S.
Climate Change Science Program alarmingly concluded that ―[m]aintaining
the status quo of estuarine management would guarantee growing failures in
meeting all . . . management goals under progressive climate change.‖334
The absence of a programmatic infrastructure for agency learning makes it
unsurprising that most existing CCMPs by and large have failed to adopt any
climate change adaptations. Charlotte Harbor is one of the most advanced
NEP estuaries on climate change planning, yet its 2008 CCMP only included
two pages on climate change..335 The only mention of adaptation is a brief list
of preliminary strategies that either seek information and outside support336 or
that are only tangentially related to estuarine resources.337 Though Charlotte
Harbor has obtained funding from EPA to develop a vulnerability
assessment338 and adaptation plan339 for a portion of the estuary, it only
appears to be considering adopting various direct, substantive adaptations.340

332 See VICTOR S. KENNEDY ET AL., COASTAL AND MARINE ECOSYSTEMS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE:
POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON U.S. RESOURCES 7 (2002).
333 See Peterson et al., supra note 96, at 3 (―[C]urrent policies allowing shoreline armoring to protect
private property from damaging erosion imply escalating losses of public tidewater lands . . . .‖).
334 Id. at 1.
335 See CHARLOTTE CCMP, supra note 321, at 137–38. Some estuaries, such as the Massachusetts Bays
Program, may include adaptation strategies as they update their plans. See, e.g., Mass. Bays Program, State of
the Bays, Special Topic: Climate Change and the Massachusetts Bays Program, http://www.mass.gov/
envir/massbays/climate.htm (last visited May 5, 2009) (discussing updates to the Massachusetts Bay Program
to reflect ―emerging challenges that climate change presents‖).
336 These include identifying ―potentially critical areas to be addressed related to adaptation,‖ developing
a greenhouse gas emissions and carbon sequestration inventory, and working with the EPA. CHARLOTTE
CCMP, supra note 321, at 137.
337 These include considering support for a governor‘s executive order, encouraging ―reduce, reuse and
recycl[ing]‖ policies, increasing remote communications, and encouraging the hotel industry to gain a green
lodging certification. Id.
338 See CHARLOTTE HARBOR NAT‘L ESTUARY PROGRAM, SCOPE OF WORK FOR THE EPA REGION 4
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT GRANT (040108 CRE REG 4 CRE), AN ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECTS
ON ECOSYSTEMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE SURROUNDING THE CHARLOTTE HARBOR ESTUARY (2008).
339 See CHARLOTTE HARBOR NAT‘L ESTUARY PROGRAM, ADAPTATION PLAN: DEVELOPMENT OF CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION PLAN FOR A SOUTHWEST FLORIDA COASTAL CITY, SCOPE OF WORK (2008).
340 See id. at 3 (listing substantive adaptation options: ―[a]void importation of new exotic plants,‖
―[p]rotect waterway buffers,‖ and ―[p]rotect coastal habitats through land acquisition and conservation
easements‖); Charlotte Harbor Nat‘l Estuary Program, Charlotte Harbor Climate Ready Estuaries April 9,
2009 Workshop, http://www.chnep.org/projects/CRE/4-9-09_vulnerabilityadapations.pdf (listing ninety-two
possible adaptation options, with ―[m]ore rigorous agency review of development,‖ ―[u]se flexible planning,‖
and ―[b]etter distribution of information‖ as the only potentially procedural adaptations considered).
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b. The Climate Ready Estuaries Program
To aid estuaries in identifying climate change vulnerabilities and
developing adaptation plans, in June 2008, the EPA inaugurated a Climate
Ready Estuaries (CRE) program as part of the NEP.341 Though still new, the
CRE program is a rare procedural adaptation strategy that, in a limited sense,
seeks to increase the adaptive capacity of agencies to address climate change
despite the substantial uncertainties regarding localized effects. EPA created a
publicly accessible ―Coastal Toolkit‖ that essentially serves as an annotated
bibliography of internet links ―for estuaries and coastal programs interested in
learning more about climate impacts and adaptation.‖342 The portal organizes
links to information (including examples) on climate change monitoring,
coastal vulnerability tools, smart growth, data sources, adaptation planning,
and financing opportunities.343
Additionally, the pilot program designates six NEP estuaries—including
Charlotte Harbor—to which EPA intends to provide targeted support to ―1)
assess climate change vulnerabilities, 2) develop and implement adaptation
strategies, 3) engage and educate stakeholders, and 4) share the lessons learned
with other coastal managers.‖344 Furthermore, an EPA white paper created by
the CRE program recommends to individual estuaries that they incorporate
monitoring and evaluation in adaptation planning ―in the style of adaptive
management.‖345 The EPA thus plans to increase the capacities of individual
341 See U.S. EPA, Climate Ready Estuaries, http://www.epa.gov/cre/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2009) (stating
that the CRE program works with NEPs to assess climate change vulnerabilities, develop and implement
adaptation strategies, engage and educate stakeholders, and share the lessons learned with other coastal
managers).
342 U.S. EPA, Climate Ready Estuaries, Coastal Toolkit, http://www.epa.gov/cre/toolkit.html (last visited
May 5, 2009).
343 Id.
344 See U.S. EPA, supra note 341. The other five estuaries currently involved in the program are the
Albemarle-Pamlico Sounds National Estuary Program, Massachusetts Bays Program, New Hampshire
Estuaries Project, Partnership for Delaware Estuary, and San Francisco Estuary Project. See also U.S. EPA,
Climate Ready Estuaries, http://nerrs08.elkhornslough.org/content/Sector%20Materials/Managers/Materials/
Managers‘Foldercontents_EPAClimateReadyEstuariesInformation.pdf (last visited July 7, 2009) (listing the
six NEPs included in the CRE program).
345 U.S. EPA, ADAPTATION PLANNING FOR THE NATIONAL ESTUARY PROGRAM, WHITE PAPER 1 (2009),
available at http://www.epa.gov/CRE/downloads/CREAdaptationPlanning-Final.pdf. See also id. at 6
(―Adaptation plans should include an outline of the process that will be used to periodically monitor and
evaluate: (1) climate-driven changes in the estuary, and (2) the effectiveness of adaptation actions in lessening
the negative impacts of those climate-driven changes. . . . Ideally, an adaptation plan will reflect the need for
regular evaluation of adaptation effectiveness and incorporation of new or better information on climate
effects. Rather than a static plan, authors of an estuary‘s climate change adaptation plan must consider the
dynamic nature of information and climate interactions, and build in a regular process to revisit the plan‘s
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estuaries to address climate change by providing them with information on the
relative value of various strategies.
Unfortunately, the CRE program is repeating mistakes from prior adaptive
regulatory experiments. The CRE‘s Coastal Toolkit is certainly an upgrade on
conventional information infrastructures, assembling publicly available
scientific data from disparate sources, decision-support tools, and reports
relevant to estuarine adaptation to climate change. As such, it facilitates
agency information sharing and has the potential to foster intergovernmental
learning, at least at the front-end during creation of adaptation plans.
However, as with prior experimental programs, EPA has not demonstrated
any intent to treat the CRE program like an ongoing management experiment.
The program is quite limited in funding and does not have nor does it promise
long-term funding to local estuary programs.346 More importantly, though the
scientific information and models included in the Coastal Toolkit are likely to
be useful, the toolkit lacks systematic information evaluating the past
performance of estuarine management strategies or CCMPs on which EPA or
Congress could rely for adapting the NEP program to better address
conventional resource stressors, let alone climate change. Because systematic
assessments of the performance of CCMPs have never occurred, little
information on the effectiveness of potential adaptation strategies can be
included in the toolkit.
Moreover, EPA appears not to have developed any systematic framework
for modifying adaptation strategies or the CRE program over time. It is
certainly a positive step that the CRE program suggests that estuaries
periodically monitor and evaluate their adaptation plans.347 Nonetheless, the
lessons of prior adaptive management experiments indicate that estuaries are
not likely to engage in adaptive management of their adaptation plans unless
required to do so. Furthermore, if the CRE program itself were adaptive, it
would impose rigorous monitoring and systematic assessments of the CRE‘s
activities to evaluate whether adopted strategies are effective and to modify
them when they are not. Instead, the CRE seems poised to employ the far less
rigorous, highly problematic, but altogether common approach used by natural

specified priorities and actions. This may require a standing or ad hoc workgroup consisting of stakeholders
and decision makers, or some other ongoing structure or practice, to ensure that the plan stays up-to-date and
effective.‖).
346 Telephone interview with Jeremy Martinich, U.S. EPA, Climate Change Division (July 18, 2008).
347 See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
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resource regulators—relying on anecdotal evidence rather than rigorous
analyses anchored in regulatory experimentation.348
2. The Climate Change Science Program
The only other federal program to provide more detailed consideration of
adaptations that foster adaptive or collaborative governance is the U.S. Climate
Change Science Program (CCSP), a federally funded research effort on climate
change sponsored by thirteen federal agencies.349 Though it is encouraging
that the CCSP acknowledges the need for adaptive management and agency
collaboration, it neither has the capacity to implement such strategies nor
addresses a number of the important limitations of prior attempts at
collaborative and adaptive governance.
In its 2008 Preliminary Review of Adaptation Options for Climate-Sensitive
Ecosystems and Resources: Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.4 (SAP 4.4),
the authors described adaptive management as a key adaptation tool for
climate-sensitive ecosystems and resources.350 The report suggests that, given
the complexity of climate change, adaptive management ―may be the only way
to take management action today while allowing for increased understanding
and refinement tomorrow.‖351 It also mentions the need for intergovernmental
collaboration, stating that making sure that ―management is done at appropriate
scales, and not necessarily simply the scales of convenience or tradition,‖ and
stating that increasing ―collaboration among agencies‖ will ―aid in achieving
adaptation to climate change.‖352
In fact, in some respects, the CCSP is itself a partial step toward a
coordinating body for responding to climate change. The CCSP was
established as a method for assembling federal research on climate change.353
348

See Camacho I, supra note 14, at 342.
See U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, U.S. Climate Change Science Program: Participating
Agencies, http://www.climatescience.gov/about/agencies.htm (last visited May 5, 2009).
350 See USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 79, at 1.
351 Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 27.
352 Id. at 36. See also id. at 37 (―Although a single national park or national forest may have limited
capacity for adaptation, the entire system of parks and forests and refuges in a region may have the capacity
for adaptation.‖). However, the CCSP‘s analysis focuses primarily on federally managed lands, virtually
ignoring resources on private, state, and local property.
353 See U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, THE U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM: VISION FOR THE PROGRAM AND HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC
STRATEGIC PLAN 29 (2003) (―The strategy seeks to optimize the benefits of research that is conducted,
sponsored, or applied by 13 agencies and departments of the U.S. Government.‖).
349
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The primary research output of the CCSP, the Synthesis and Assessment
Products, are intended to provide ―current assessments of climate change
science to inform public debate, policy, and operational decisions‖ and to ―help
the CCSP develop future program research priorities.‖354 In this sense, the
CCSP could be a welcome beginning to an infrastructure for information
gathering and dissemination that could assist natural resource managers across
jurisdictions in addressing climate change.
Unfortunately, the CCSP has no regulatory or management authority over
natural resources.355 Consequently, though various federal natural resource
agencies may have contributed to a report that notes the potential of adaptive
management and the need for interagency collaboration, these same agencies
also acknowledge that they have not developed any way to integrate the
research into the management process.356 Much like the Glen Canyon AMP,
the CCSP may be an interesting research exercise, but it provides limited value
if it is not a part of a comprehensive management effort for adapting agency
decisions.
More substantively, though SAP 4.4 identifies a number of key problems
with existing governance, it nonetheless ignores essential lessons from prior
regulatory experiments for addressing these shortcomings. To its credit, SAP
4.4 does acknowledge that monitoring is essential, that managers lack
resources for identifying the optimal strategy for a specific situation,357 and
that the risk of failure and weak rewards discourage regulators from engaging

354 Carlos M. Gutierrez et al., Letter to Members of Congress, in USCCSP, ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra
note 79.
355 See ROBERT L. PETERS, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, BEYOND CUTTING EMISSIONS: PROTECTING
WILDLIFE AND ECOSYSTEMS IN A WARMING WORLD 16 (2008) (―The [CCSP] lacks authority to allocate or
prioritize funding in the agencies it works with, and the members of the interagency working group often have
little budgetary authority to implement the research directions that they define.‖ (footnote omitted)). Though
several federal agencies contribute, so do non-governmental actors, and the CCSP is considered solely a
research program with no direct link to the regulatory process. See Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 39
(observing that the CCSP only coordinates climate change research and suggesting the possibility of
expanding the CCSP to include management research and coordination).
356 See, e.g., Allen M. Solomon, U.S. Forest Serv., Global Change and the US Forest Service: The Nature
of the Climate Threats We Face, http://www.fs.fed.us/rmrs/docs/climate-change/national-briefing-papers.pdf
(last visited July 5, 2009) (―The U.S. Forest Service has a basic global change research program now 15 years
old, and a research infrastructure ready to support a focused effort. . . . There is no FS-wide global change
strategy to apply that research or create new information needed to manage with uncertainty.‖).
357 These tools include the ways of interpreting models, prioritizing actions, and identifying tradeoffs. See
Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 33–35 (discussing perceived barriers to effective implementation of
adaptation).
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in adaptive management.358 The report also mentions other challenges in
implementing adaptive management, including the absence of intra-agency
coordination.359 Finally, in SAP 4.4, the CCSP perceptively concedes that
―minimal institutional capacity exists to capture experience and expand
learning,‖ so that ―many agency personnel do not have adequate training,
expertise, or understanding to effectively address emerging issues.‖360 These
are rare observations by a government-sponsored authority about the limited
adaptive capacity of government institutions to address climate change.361
Nonetheless, the CCSP ignores some flaws in existing governance and fails
to provide solutions for some deficiencies it does identify. For example,
though recognizing the importance of monitoring, SAP 4.4 overlooks that poor
monitoring and enforcement are endemic to natural resource programs362 and
fails to suggest strategies for improvement (such as encouraging stakeholder
involvement in monitoring).363 Instead, the CCSP suggests that current
monitoring indicators for climate change—even those based on historical
conditions—are usually satisfactory.364 Similarly, in attempting to address the
challenges of implementing adaptive management, the CCSP asks agencies to
include ―hypotheses, monitoring, periodic re-evaluations, and flexibility‖ when
using adaptive management.365 The CCSP thus ignores the lessons of
regulatory experiments like the Glen Canyon AMP and the Habitat
358 See id. at 31–33 (stating that some agencies rely on a reward system that ―provides few incentives for
creative project development and implementation[,]‖ and that there is a ―[l]ack of incentive to take risks‖).
359 See, e.g., Joyce et al., supra note 83, at 43–44 (―[Adaptive management] would need to involve
managers at various levels to[:] monitor changes in the ecosystem[;] . . . coordinate and make appropriate
changes in policies, regulations, plans, and programs at all relevant scales; and modify the on-the-ground
practices needed to implement these higher-level policies. This degree of cross-scale integration is not
typically achieved at present . . . .‖). See also Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 26 (―Recent examinations of
the difficulty of actually using adaptive management have emphasized that the temporal and spatial scale,
dimension of uncertainty, risks, and institutional support can create major difficulties . . . .‖).
360 Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
361 Similarly, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently affirmed that resource managers do
not have the direction they need to design new adaptive management systems. See GAO REPORT, supra note
142, at 9–10 (outlining the limited guidance that resource managers receive to address climate change).
362 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
363 Instead, the CCSP appears to be skeptical of public participation. Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 35
(―Stakeholders often do not have full information, sufficient expertise, or a long-term perspective that allows
them to evaluate the relative merit of adaptation options. Therefore, they may act to inhibit or even block the
use of adaptation in management planning.‖).
364 See id. at 26 (discussing current monitoring indicators). But see Joyce et al., supra note 83, at 56
(―[H]istorical targets, traditionally used as references for restoration, are often inappropriate in the face of
changing climates . . . .‖); Scott et al., supra note 96, at 49 (―[H]istorical conditions . . . are unlikely to be
reasonable management goals in the face of climate change.‖).
365 Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 26.
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Conservation Plan program that demonstrate the perils of leaving design of
adaptive management to agencies and not requiring agency monitoring and reevaluation. Instead, the report merely hopes that the uncertainty of climate
change ―may galvanize managers to embrace adaptive management as an
essential strategy.‖366
Most notably, though it acknowledges that existing agencies lack the
capacity to capture experience and learn, SAP 4.4 fails to propose or identify
any systemic strategies for cultivating regulatory learning. On the positive
side, the CCSP proposes changes to manager and regulator incentives to
promote learning.367 Yet it ignores the need for fundamental changes to the
governance structure to induce regulators and managers to learn from past
performance and each other.
Ultimately, though the non-binding
recommendations of the CCSP, if adopted, would be a considerable
improvement on existing approaches to resource management, they
nonetheless fail to provide sufficiently comprehensive guidance to government
institutions on how to better adapt to climate change.
V. TOWARD ADAPTIVE NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE
As detailed in Part III, existing natural resource programs are not adaptive
and fail to sufficiently encourage managers and regulators to learn how to
methodically manage uncertainty and make resource management more
effective at achieving program goals. The few governmental efforts described
in Part IV that attempt to adapt natural resource regulation and management to
climate change fail to address these problems, leaving natural resource
governance vulnerable to the exceptional uncertainty that climate change
brings. To expand the collective capacity for managing this uncertainty,
Congress must establish a proactive, no-regrets infrastructure that helps
resource managers learn from previous resource management strategies and
decision-making processes.
The two core components of this learning infrastructure are a collaborative
network for fostering information sharing and an adaptive methodology for
assessing and adjusting government decision making over time. With clear
366

Id.
See Baron et al., supra note 96, at 2 (―Learning is further enhanced by providing training opportunities,
supporting continuous inquiry, promoting an atmosphere of respect, rewarding personal initiative,
and . . . allowing for unintentional failure.‖); Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 31–32 (explaining the need to
shift agency reward systems to promote creative project development and implementation).
367
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legislative directives and sufficient resources, and by experimenting with
incentives for regulators and stakeholders, legislators can encourage agency
learning about the effectiveness of adaptation strategies and decision-making
processes. These measures would work to increase the effectiveness of
government decision making and foster agency accountability to federal and
state legislatures, stakeholders, and the public.
A. Fostering Intergovernmental Information Sharing
Due to the long-term and large-scale nature of climate change effects, the
unprecedented uncertainty regarding such effects on particular resources, and
the limited authority of regulators and managers to address resource problems,
it is not surprising that the de facto response by most regulators is to ignore
climate change. In such an uncertain regulatory environment, mistakes may be
inevitable, and adaptation mistakes that require restoration of seriously
threatened habitats or the creation of new habitats could lead to unanticipated
threats to ecosystem health and high—possibly immeasurable—costs.368 As
such, it is predictable (and perhaps even understandable) that many regulators
and managers prefer to neglect such a complex and exceptional problem.
Yet the uncertainties and risks of error associated with climate change must
be managed, not ignored. The funding and development by Congress of a
large-scale procedural adaptation that fosters information sharing is crucial for
reducing the negative effects of regulatory fragmentation and managing the
uncertainty from climate change. Beyond establishing regional venues that
provide opportunities for collaborating on decision making,369 such a network
should include a publicly accessible clearinghouse for information sharing.
Affording regulators opportunities to work with similarly situated authorities
and access information systematically integrated from the diverse research and
experience of other agencies would help reduce uncertainty by allowing
regulators to tap into a broader set of scientific data and management
experiences. Doing so would reduce the impediments to adaptation and
agency learning that result from regulatory fragmentation.
Such an information clearinghouse could be housed and administered by
any number of government institutions, including the Library of Congress
368

IPCC, ADAPTATION, supra note 23, at 247.
Cf. PETERS, supra note 355, at 20, 22 (recommending a national strategy that includes ―a high level of
coordination among agencies‖ and that facilitates ―agencies working together to develop strategic plans and
internal guidance, conduct and share biological research, and develop and adopt effective management tools‖).
369
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(akin to its ―Thomas‖370 web portal), the White House Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ),371 or the embryonic USGS‘s National Climate
Change and Wildlife Science Center.372 The clearinghouse should incorporate
scientific data on projected effects of climate change and other stressors,
decision-support tools, and models for analyzing localized effects, as well as
information on the advantages and disadvantages of potential management
strategies in a variety of contexts. Undoubtedly, the generation of these types
of additional data is sorely needed. However, as illustrated by the efforts of
the Climate Ready Estuaries (CRE) program,373 much data already exists but is
widely dispersed among an assortment of private and public institutions and is
often inaccessible electronically. As EPA has done with its CRE program,
agencies could begin by developing databases and portals that collect and
organize such information in one electronic location. Beyond EPA‘s efforts,
agencies must regularly supplement and revise such records over time.
Information currently gathered by international, intergovernmental, and foreign
institutions, such as the United Nations Environment Programme, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the European Environment
Agency could also be readily accessible through the clearinghouse.
Yet to truly promote intergovernmental learning on resource management,
such a clearinghouse would have to include information that today is rarely
generated by any natural resource agency—systematic reports on the past
performance of resource management strategies toward accomplishing
regulatory goals.374 By providing regulators access to information on the
achievements and limitations of past management strategies, Congress would
help reduce uncertainty by allowing regulators considering adaptations to draw
from other management experiences. Furthermore, making such information
publicly available would increase the transparency of agency decision making
and promote agency accountability to legislatures and the public.
Though there may be a superficial appeal to the consolidation of resource
management to address the shortcomings of regulatory fragmentation, the
370

See THOMAS, http://www.thomas.gov/ (last visited May 15, 2009).
See White House Council on Environmental Quality, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/
ceq/ (last visited May 15, 2009).
372 See USGS, supra note 313. In fact, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, does
propose creating an adaptation science and information program at USGS to assess existing forecasting
capabilities, develop tools for forecasting, monitoring, and managing climate change effects, and promoting
data sharing. See American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 285, at § 477(d).
373 See CLIMATE READY ESTUARIES, supra notes 342–43 and accompanying text.
374 See infra Part V.B.
371
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creation of a national network that cultivates information sharing while
maintaining concurrent management better accommodates the benefits of
decentralized governance. Because fragmented governance can produce
disincentives for agencies to learn and encourage inaction regarding problems
like climate change, there may be a strong temptation to centralize regulatory
authority and provide one answer to preempt all others. However, while there
may be benefits to eliminating redundancy in certain circumstances,375 there
are considerable advantages to a decentralized and overlapping regulatory
system.376 Elaborating on long-asserted benefits of decentralized governance
and federalism,377 numerous scholars have pointed out some of the strategic
advantages of a ―dynamic,‖378 ―adaptive,‖379 ―interactive‖380 or
―polyphonic‖381 federal system that relies on fragmented governance.
Designed correctly, such a system may allow for a diversity of tailored
approaches and help cultivate an array of laboratories of innovation for
collective learning about the benefits and detriments of particular management
strategies.382
Furthermore, overlapping jurisdiction can allow various
375 For example, William Buzbee has argued that reducing the number of potential regulators and/or
increasing the regulatory authority of particular regulators could lessen the incentives for regulatory inaction,
though such cases are inevitably context-specific. Buzbee II, supra note 137, at 51; Buzbee I, supra note 129,
at 362.
376 See generally Buzbee I, supra note 129, at 324–25, 359–61 (describing potential advantages to
―regulatory fragmentation‖).
377 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders‟ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484 (1987) (detailing the historical objectives and benefits of a ―dual sovereignty‖ federal system). But see
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903
(1994) (contesting many of the asserted benefits of federalism).
378 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 136, at 40–43 (summarizing the current scholarly commentary
surrounding ―dynamic federalism‖).
379 David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1813–31 (2007) (discussing the strengths of
adaptive systems as applied to environmental federalism).
380 Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 296–99 (2005)
(arguing that polyphonic federalism advances goals of dualist federalism and gives greater scope to state
power).
381 Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 1409, 1411 (1999).
382 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 379, at 1819 (―[A]daptive systems [such as dynamic federalism]
protect diversity against the winnowing effects of optimizing processes through a fragmented structure and
disruptive events.‖); id. at 1847–48 (noting that state and local initiatives function as ―laboratories of
democracy‖); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, in PREEMPTION
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM‘S CORE QUESTION 277, 290 (William W. Buzbee
ed., 2009) (―Adaptive federalism simultaneously sustains competitive legislation and administrative processes
that promote the refinement of policies . . . and processes that produce a diverse range of policy options.‖). Cf.
Ann Joseph O‘Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the
Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1676–77 (2006) (stating agency redundancy can prevent ―group
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specialized knowledge sets (municipal local experience or agency subjectmatter expertise) to be brought to bear on a particular problem.383 Concurrent
authority can also provide opportunities for inter-agency accountability.384
The challenge, then, is balancing the efficiency benefits of centralized
decision making with the diversity benefits of decentralized governance.385
Developing a shared information infrastructure is an effective way to lessen the
collective-action problem and minimize the impediments to collaborative
learning of a decentralized system while maintaining its benefits.386 To
maintain the diversity benefits of divided government, such a clearinghouse
and coordination effort would neither require agency consolidation nor
agreement on a particular strategy. However, it would require information
flow and dialogue among regulators. This could be accomplished by
mandating that each regulator‘s strategy is monitored and periodically
evaluated against stated regulatory goals and that such assessments are made
available to all regulators with jurisdiction through a shared, publicly
accessible information clearinghouse. Through such a framework, agencies
could better learn from the successes and mistakes of other regulators in their
management of natural resources.387 Such agencies would also serve as
sources of external pressure on other regulators to engage in monitoring,
reporting, and adjustment of adopted strategies.
Like most other regional collaborations, the Great Lakes Regional
Collaboration (GLRC) could be viewed as an attempt at an informationsharing regime, but if so it is a very weak one. Though the GLRC has
provided agencies opportunities for dialogue and collaboration on decision
making, it never established a comprehensive information infrastructure that
would facilitate inter-agency learning. The GLRC has not created a repository
for pooling data or analyses on management strategies; indeed, regulators have
think‖ and agency capture, and promote agency competition that may yield better outcomes than
coordination).
383 Cf. Camacho III, supra note 203, at 321–23 (discussing the subject matter expertise of agencies and
the localized knowledge of local government authorities).
384 See infra notes 416–417 and accompanying text.
385 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 382, at 285 (―The challenge is to maintain a process of optimization,
which leads to specialization and efficiencies, while cultivating a diversity of backup options in the wings.‖).
386 Cf. William W. Buzbee, Interaction‟s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 164 (2007) (―[L]earning-by-monitoring regimes . . . can provide
huge benefits . . . perhaps in provision of government services.‖).
387 Cf. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 136, at 51 (suggesting that agency collaborations that do not mandate
agreement may be more effective at solving complex problems if they preserve agency autonomy and
accountability and if each agency clearly understands its responsibilities and range of discretion).
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not even conducted such analyses. Other evaluations of collaborative
governance experiments have similarly found that scarce information about
ecological processes, management strategies, and agency performance
contributes greatly to failure by collaborative experiments.388
Undoubtedly, creating and maintaining a user-friendly and comprehensive
clearinghouse of information is challenging. Others have recommended
analogous data repositories for environmental assessment data,389 where the
potential to apply modern information technology has been similarly underutilized, but existing databases are far from complete.390 An administering
agency would have to balance the need for an interface and databases that are
publicly accessible and easily searchable391 with the need to ensure that such
tools are also comprehensive392 and adaptable.393
As the lessons of natural resource governance make clear, establishing a
flawless infrastructure at the outset may be impossible, so the clearinghouse
itself can and should be monitored and adjusted over time to improve its utility
and accessibility. Only by establishing and refining a network that promotes
the creation, collection, and dissemination of information on the effects of
climate change and the value of different strategies can we both reduce the
barriers to effective action and cultivate a diverse range of management
options that facilitates collective learning. Combined with the adaptive
approach to governance delineated in the next section, establishing such a
388 See Karkkainen I, supra note 14, at 1442 (―[A]n equally important factor is information, or rather, its
scarcity.‖).
389 See Daniel A. Farber, Bringing Environmental Assessment into the Digital Age, in TAKING STOCK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 219, 219 (Jane Holder & Donald McGillivray
eds., 2007) (lamenting the difficulty of accessing environmental assessment data); Joseph F.C. DiMento &
Helen Ingram, Science and Environmental Decision Making: The Potential Role of Environmental Impact
Assessment in the Pursuit of Appropriate Information, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 300 (2005) (―The federal
government and the states should work together to create regional institutes to collect project and program
environmental analyses. The institutes should also be repositories of environmental intelligence on the regions
from other data-generating institutions.‖(footnote omitted)).
390 See infra note 406 and accompanying text. Both the State of California and Canada‘s Environmental
Assessment Agency have created prototypical online aggregations of environmental assessment data, but
neither contains even links to the full reports. Farber, supra note 389, at 235–37.
391 See Farber, supra note 389, at 235, 242. Farber suggests that though a general search engine such as
Google might be effective, a tailored search engine is preferable. See id. at 242. Integrating geographic
information system (GIS) technology, which would allow environmental data to be organized in a series of
layers, could enhance comprehensiveness. See id. at 221, 243–47; DiMento & Ingram, supra note 389, at
302–03. However, this might hinder public accessibility.
392 See Farber, supra note 389, at 237–38.
393 For example, the database should be able to incorporate follow-up information such as monitoring
data. See id. at 238–40.
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network would initiate the infrastructure needed for regulators to assess and
manage the effects of climate change more effectively.
B. Cultivating Adaptive Management and Governance
As detailed earlier,394 recent adaptive management experiments provide
key lessons for future governance that can help legislators build on the insights
of the adaptive management theoretical literature. Governance processes
should be structured to induce agencies and stakeholders to learn—not only
about the merits of particular resource decisions, but also more broadly about
regulatory strategies and processes. Congress should establish this adaptive
governance infrastructure through cross-cutting legislation that requires federal
agencies to monitor and adaptively manage their decisions and programs, and
provide funding and incentives for agencies to do so. When combined with a
cross-jurisdictional information network, the development of such an
infrastructure would promote agency accountability and help manage the
uncertainty that comes with climate change.
One potentially fruitful legislative avenue that would help create an
adaptive governance process is a sweeping amendment to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).395 By requiring federal agencies
to prepare environmental impact statements that disclose the effects of—and
alternatives to—any proposed ―major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment,‖396 NEPA does provide a baseline
regulatory framework for generating and releasing information. About half the
states have analogous statutes applicable to state and local agencies.397 As a
result, most federal, state, and local agencies already are accustomed to some
form of procedural framework for generating information for proposed agency
activities.
However, NEPA would have to be fundamentally re-fashioned for it to
serve as a comprehensive adaptive governance framework. Others have
chronicled the limitations of NEPA as a structure for generating quality

394

See supra Part III.C.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4375 (2000).
396 See id. § 4332(2)(C).
397 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government‟s
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 n.7 (2002) [hereinafter Karkkainen IV] (noting
that more than 25 states have emulated NEPA).
395
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information and promoting dynamic learning.398 Environmental analyses
under NEPA are characteristically static, one-time assessments assembled
when the agency provides public notice of its proposed action.399 As such, not
only does NEPA allow agencies to conduct such analyses too late in the
decision-making process to influence agency decisions,400 it also does not
require agencies to review an analysis after an action is adopted through
follow-up monitoring.401 Additionally, NEPA does not specifically require
adaptive management.402 As a result, agencies rarely revisit prior NEPA
analyses to ascertain if they were accurate403 or review previously adopted
mitigation measures to determine if they were effective.404 In short, NEPA
does not require agencies to learn.405
Moreover, as with other statutes, little information sharing occurs through
existing NEPA programs. Neither Congress nor the relevant federal agencies
have created a comprehensive infrastructure to collect and facilitate the broad
dissemination of the information that has been generated through NEPA
analyses to other agencies and the broader public. The NEPA data that does
exist is compiled by various institutions, and many NEPA analyses are not
tracked, compiled, or otherwise accessible to the public, other agencies, or
even different officials in the same agency.406
To establish the learning infrastructure necessary to promote adaptive
governance and intergovernmental information sharing, NEPA would have to
be fundamentally transformed. Congress would have to amend NEPA to
398 See, e.g., id. at 905 (describing the shortcomings of the NEPA process); Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation
Planning and Climate Impact Assessments: Learning from NEPA‟s Flaws, 39 ENVTL L. REP.: NEWS &
ANALYSIS 1065 (2009); DiMento & Ingram, supra note 389, at 283.
399 Karkkainen IV, supra note 397, at 970 (―The attempt to execute an accurate and comprehensive one
time, synoptic, prospective assessment of environmental impacts and the full range of possible solutions turns
out to be an extremely time and resource intensive exercise that produces a massive, highly uncertain, tardy,
and often, when all is said and done, not terribly informative document.‖).
400 See id. at 907, 926, 970 (asserting that the assessments are ―tardy‖).
401 See id. at 927 (―NEPA does not generally require ‗post project assessment,‘ that is, ongoing
monitoring . . . .‖).
402 However, DOI and USFS have considered incorporating adaptive management into rules
implementing NEPA. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
403 See Karkkainen IV, supra note 397, at 928 (noting a lack of monitoring data is one critical reason that
it was impossible to determine the accuracy of predicted impacts).
404 See id. at 908 (―[I]n the absence of follow-up monitoring we have no assurance that the mitigation
measures . . . will turn out to be as effective as anticipated.‖).
405 See Farber, supra note 398, at 10609 (―NEPA provides few learning mechanisms‖).
406 See Karkkainen IV, supra note 397, at 946–48 (pointing out that although EPA, the Center for
Environmental Quality, and even the Office of the Federal Register do, in a limited sense, compile some data
produced under NEPA, many NEPA analyses are not subject to reporting or easily accessible).
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require federal agencies to conduct adaptive management of NEPA decisions,
including: (1) regular monitoring of agency actions that require NEPA
clearance; (2) systematic assessment of adopted management strategies
comparing any mitigation measures against their initial projected effects; and
(3) periodic adjustment of such strategies and measures over time. To cultivate
intergovernmental information sharing, Congress would also have to establish
a national clearinghouse of NEPA information akin to that proposed in Part
V.A.407
However, because NEPA only contemplates information gathering and
assessment in the context of declared agency actions, amending NEPA alone
may not sufficiently cover important contexts in which adaptive governance
and information sharing may be useful and necessary. NEPA only applies
when federal action is proposed.408 Yet because the initial question in
adaptation planning is not how a particular human action will affect the
environment, but rather how to minimize the effects of climate change most
effectively, proactive adaptation to climate change may necessitate analyses in
contexts in which federal action has not been proposed.409
As such, Congress should also establish an adaptive governance framework
as part of organic adaptation planning legislation. Such a statute could take
many forms, but, in addition to establishing the comprehensive information
repository detailed in Part V.A, supra, it should include four elemental
features. First, such legislation should require and fund robust agency
monitoring of existing natural systems. Through such observation, agencies
can better understand the systems they regulate and better tailor management
strategies to be more effective at achieving program goals.
Second, it should require the creation, monitoring, and periodic adjustment
of adaptation plans by federal and state410 natural resource agencies. Congress
407 Cf. DiMento & Ingram, supra note 389, at 300–02 (recommending establishing joint federal-state
repositories for environmental information generated under NEPA).
408 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399 (1976). See also Farber, supra note 389, at 10608.
409 See Farber, supra note 398, at 10607 (―Adaptation planning . . . flip[s] current practices in
environmental law around: instead of asking how human activities impact the environment, we instead begin
by asking how environmental change will impact humans.‖).
410 Congress could require adaptation planning by state resource agencies that receive federal funding for
conservation activities on nonfederal lands. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, supra
note 285, at § 479(a)–(b) (proposing a requirement that states seeking adaptation funding assistance adopt
natural resource adaptation plans). See also PETERS, supra note 355, at 22 (discussing the State Wildlife
Grants program, the North American Wetlands Conservation Act, the Farm Bill conservation programs, and
the Cooperative Endangered Species Fund).
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should oblige such plans to include (1) information about the projected effects
of climate change on natural systems, (2) how the agency‘s statutorilymandated goals are implicated (if at all) by such potential effects, and (3)
adaptation strategy alternatives to address such effects in furtherance of the
agency‘s goals. Congress should also require agencies to monitor, assess, and
adjust such plans periodically and to make such information publicly
accessible. As opposed to previous adaptive management experiments such as
the Glen Canyon AMP, agencies must be given not only the permission to
monitor and assess performance with such goals, but also the responsibility to
do so.411 Such a directive would provide an explicit incentive for agencies to
learn, advance governmental accountability, and reduce uncertainty, thus
helping private and public actors respond more effectively to the effects of
changing climate.
Third, such agencies must be charged with engaging in adaptive
governance: periodically monitoring, assessing, and adapting not only their
adopted adaptation plans, but also their resource programs in furtherance of
congressional goals for that program. For this to occur, regulatory programs
like the Glen Canyon AMP must identify priorities and goals, requiring
legislative direction regarding the difficult tradeoffs between competing
resource values. The agency must also create measurable performance
thresholds for evaluating management decisions, resource managers, and the
regulatory program itself. Cultivating this adaptive governance will improve
the accountability and legitimacy of agency decision making by providing
metrics to the agencies, Congress, and stakeholders for evaluating agency
strategies and the agencies themselves. In the context of climate change,
adaptive governance also provides a way to reduce and manage the substantial
uncertainties that arise in trying to adapt both natural and regulatory systems to
incomparable change. Agency personnel will have the obligation to generate,
and the opportunity to access, up-to-date information about not only the
projected local effects of climate change, but also how successful existing
strategies have been in responding to other stressors.

However, it is important to note that requiring states to adopt adaptation plans may include, but
certainly does not necessitate, substantive review by federal authorities to ensure these state plans conform to
federal adaptation efforts. Indeed, such centralized review of state efforts may be antithetical to the promotion
of regulatory experimentation and innovation in adaptation activities.
411 The DOI has acknowledged that successful implementation of adaptive management requires a
mandate for its use and a long-term ―institutional capacity and commitment‖ to implement it. WILLIAMS ET
AL., supra note 223, at 9.
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Finally, Congress must provide sufficient resources and other incentives to
give agencies the motivation to participate and engage in adaptive management
and regulatory adaptation. Of course, resources are always vital to the success
of any regulatory program, and others have called for high and sustained levels
of funding for adaptation activities.412 Yet, an adaptive process particularly
calls attention to the need for sustained resources for monitoring,
implementation, and enforcement. Sustained funding is one of the most
important incentives legislators can provide for encouraging agency
learning.413 Unfortunately, however, stable and sufficient support from
Congress for such functions is rare.414 Because of the longer horizon for action
on climate change adaptation and a growing recognition of the limitations of
existing natural resource management, legislatures may be more receptive to
funding adaptive governance long-term, such as through the establishment of a
trust dedicated to adaptive management and governance.415
Because adaptive governance would subject managers and regulators to
performance evaluation many may resist it.416 Yet it is worth noting that a key
benefit of creating a publicly accessible information clearinghouse is the
potential to provide incentives for managers to adjust their decisions over time.
For example, providing affected stakeholders and other agencies access to
412 See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 355, at 16 (―Lack of funding for efforts to meet the immense threat to
wildlife and ecosystems is the single greatest obstacle for natural resource agencies.‖); CAL. DEP‘T OF WATER
RES., MANAGING AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA‘S
WATER 10 (2008) (stating more stable sources of funding are needed to enable sufficient climate change
adaptation in California).
413 Doremus, supra note 16, at 572 (―By far the most important contribution legislatures can make to
learning while doing, however, is to support it through stable and sufficient funding sources.‖).
414 See Camacho I, supra note 14, at 347–48 (describing the funding obstacles these functions face);
Doremus, supra note 16, at 572–73 (explaining that legislatures, ―made up of political actors with short time
horizons,‖ have typically focused on action and ―immediate results‖ rather than learning through research and
monitoring).
415 See, e.g., COMM. ON FLOOD CONTROL ALTERNATIVES IN THE AM. RIVER BASIN, NAT‘L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN: AN EVALUATION 197 (1995)
(proposing the creation and funding of an adaptive management trust fund for the American River Canyon);
STEPHEN TYLER, ET AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR THE CENTRAL AND NORTH COAST OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA: OVERVIEW 10 (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.ilmb.gov.bc.ca/slrp/lrmp/nanaimo/
cencoast/ebmwg_docs/AMF_overview_v4_20090129.pdf (proposing a ―Coast Adaptive Management Trust‖
for British Columbia for ―impartially and transparently identifying adaptive management investment priorities;
funding high priority adaptive management projects (studies and learning activities) that cannot be funded by
other sources; and . . . communicating new management knowledge‖).
416 Cf. Doremus, supra note 16, at 571 (―[A]gencies typically enjoy enough discretion to allow them to
perpetuate ignorance. Unless learning is systematically rewarded by the legislature or the highest levels of the
executive branch—which is rare—there is little external incentive for agency leaders to buck tradition.
Internal incentives are likely to run the other way.‖).
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information on the performance of an EPA strategy not only allows such
parties to learn about the effectiveness of that strategy; it also gives them an
increased capacity to pressure EPA to comply with adaptive management
requirements and to modify the strategy when performance assessments
suggest it has not been entirely effective.417
To further promote adaptive management and foster agency accountability,
Congress should provide incentives to stakeholders—consistent with their
stake and abilities—to contribute to information generation and assist actively
in the governance process. Such incentives could include loans, grants, or tax
credits to private parties who engage in adaptive management or other
activities that provide valuable information for future adaptation activities.418
It could also include regulatory credit programs that reduce regulatory
requirements or streamline permit review processes for permit holders who
generate reliable, valuable data on the efficacy of particular conservation
efforts.419 Legislators could even enlist stakeholders to buttress monitoring or
evaluation of agency or third-party compliance with program goals. In short,
stakeholders can and should be incentivized to participate in and help evaluate
adopted strategies and agency performance.
By paying attention to regulatory design and regulator incentives, Congress
can help develop the infrastructure agencies need to learn, promote
government accountability, reduce uncertainty, and thus help private and
public actors respond more effectively to the effects of changing climate. Of
course, Congress will have the opportunity to adjust incentives over time to
more effectively promote agency learning. It is crucial that Congress persists
in placing adaptive pressure on agencies to push them to manage uncertainty
while managing the natural resources under their jurisdiction. Because such an
adaptive governance framework would also increase the transparency of
agency activities, it would promote agency accountability and serve as a noregrets adaptation strategy.

417 Senior agency officials could in turn foster learning through rewards for agency divisions that institute
learning procedures. Some have suggested that agencies provide training or develop performance evaluations
and compensation practices that promote responsible experimentation and scrupulous assessment rather than
discourage it. See Baron et al., supra note 96, at 4; Kareiva et al., supra note 111, at 30.
418 Camacho I, supra note 14, at 356.
419 See id. (―Congress could develop a credit program that allows permittees to reduce their costs for
mitigation in exchange for generating and disseminating reliable data . . . .‖ (footnote omitted)). Negative
incentives could include penalties levied on private permit holders for non-compliance with monitoring
programs. Id.
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Undoubtedly, the start-up costs of creating an adaptive governance
infrastructure will not be trivial, and many questions remain unanswered
regarding the development of effective and adaptive governance. How much
should Congress spend on monitoring and adjusting regulatory processes?
What are the optimal monitoring and adaptation protocols? Should these vary
by regulatory program or even by management strategy?
However, a fundamental advantage of the adaptive governance framework
is that, over time, it can help provide key information toward addressing these
questions.
Through systematic monitoring and assessment of the
implementation process, agencies and Congress will be able to assess the
benefits of different types of monitoring and assessment approaches to
determine the circumstances under which they are most appropriate.
Accordingly, establishing a framework for monitoring, assessing, and adjusting
agency actions and an infrastructure for gathering and disseminating such
information, will enhance the capacity of regulators and managers—and more
fundamentally, legislatures and the public—to improve the effectiveness of not
only resource management, but also agency learning procedure. Moreover, it
would increase our collective capacity to respond effectively to the multitude
of new questions and environmental stressors wrought by climate change.
CONCLUSION
Regrettably, the effects of climate change are already evident and likely to
worsen. Yet the type and extent of localized effects on ecosystems, and the
efficacy of potential adaptation strategies, are very unclear.
These
unprecedented uncertainties have impeded meaningful adaptation efforts.
Natural resource managers and policymakers not only lack information about
future effects and the value of management strategies in particular contexts,
they also lack the adaptive infrastructure to gain such information.
The limitations of existing natural resource governance may be difficult to
overcome, but the potential for fundamental changes in the human and natural
environment due to climate change necessitates a revisiting of entrenched
models of resource management. What is needed is a natural resource
governance system that manages uncertainty by allowing agencies to learn and
change over time and respond to ecosystem changes and new information
about the efficacy of particular management strategies and management
processes. In short, natural resource regulators and managers must engage in
controlled experimentation in regulatory design, and Congress must provide
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the infrastructure to facilitate this. Given the state of natural resource
governance, such a system would likely qualify as a ―no-regrets‖ adaptation
that yields dividends in the performance and accountability of government
regulators, regardless of the extent of the impacts of climate change.
The experience in natural resource management with adaptive and
collaborative experiments may also provide valuable insight on how
government officials can and must manage uncertainty that has implications
for other regulatory problems. Certainly, agencies are delegated responsibility
to manage many social threats under conditions of uncertainty, including other
environmental risks,420 financial market failure,421 and terrorism.422 Though
further analysis is undoubtedly essential, the lessons of natural resource
governance may prove valuable in these areas as well. In the end, the
comprehensive change in governance advocated here should help minimize the
mistakes that inevitably come with facing uncertain problems like climate
change with tools that are, at least initially, rather imprecise.

420 Cf. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 136, at 7 (discussing other ―massive‖ environmental problems such as
water hypoxia and urban sprawl).
421 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L.R. (forthcoming
2009–2010) (discussing complexity in financial markets); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
193 (2008) (discussing systemic risk in financial markets); Ethiopis Tafara, Office of Int‘l Affairs, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm‘n, Speech by SEC Staff: Annual Conference on Capital Management of the Risk Management
Association and Professional Risk Managers‘ International Association (Nov. 9, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/spch110904et.htm (―Securities regulators function in . . . a world of finite information and finite
resources. Making the best use of the information and resources we have in the face of uncertainty is our
ongoing task.‖).
422 Cf. David Brooks, Op-Ed, The Uncertainty Factor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2004, at A25 (discussing the
U.S. government‘s limited competence in coping with uncertainty in terrorism prevention).

